FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce you to the 2015 issue of Urban Action, a journal produced by students in the Urban Studies and Planning Program at San Francisco State University. This year’s issue is composed of an eclectic range of topics that focus on San Francisco’s dynamic waterfront, segregation in metropolitan centers, the impact of graffiti on the urban landscape, postmodern urbanism in China, planning in Kabul, Afghanistan, international aid in Nicaragua and urban development in Dubai. Although these topics are wide-ranging, the thread that binds them together is their shared focus on urbanization and urban life. Some of these articles were written as part of a student’s coursework in an Urban Studies class, others were written explicitly for this issue of the journal. In either case the student writers were exploring the dynamics of cities around the world.

This year’s editorial team worked hard to create an issue that is dynamic in both content and design; after reading the 2015 issue, I think you will join me in concluding that they succeeded. So prepare a cup of coffee or tea, find a quiet comfortable place to sit, and enjoy reading the 2015 issue of Urban Action!

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The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the network involved with planning, staging, and executing the 34th America’s Cup. The study deconstructs the changes on the San Francisco waterfront throughout the America’s Cup negotiations. Using the network theory perspective, this work will explain how the ineffectiveness of the private-public partnership between the City and County of San Francisco (the City), the America’s Cup Event Authority (ACEA) and the America’s Cup Organizing Committee (ACOC) manifested in a diminished impact on the San Francisco waterfront revitalization effort.

As used in this report, network theory is defined as a “set of concepts designed to explicate relationships that cannot be fully described in hierarchical terms” (Gormley & Balla, 2013, p. 162). How network actors interact and how they are connected greatly influence their effectiveness and Mark Granovetter (1983) suggests that weak ties are “asserted to be important because their likelihood of being bridges is greater than (and that of strong ties less than) would be expected from their numbers alone” (p. 229). The reliance on the weaker ties between network actors are argued to be better sources for innovative ideas and information.
Networks form as organizations have a common goal which is unattainable without the resources of others. Network composition can range from intergovernmental networks, where city, state, or federal agencies work together to achieve a goal, or public-private partnerships, which can “involve direct contacts between government agencies and for-profit firms or nonprofit organizations” (Gormley & Balla, 2013, p. 177). As government budgets shrink, public-private partnerships become more important, as private entities can provide the resources necessary to complete needed government projects.

As this report will describe, the 34th America’s Cup required numerous organizations and government agencies to work together to organize and execute the sporting events from 2012 to 2013, which include the final regatta to determine the winner of the 34th America’s Cup. This report suggests the ineffectiveness of the network and partnership stemmed from: (1) a decentralized, undifferentiated network; (2) faulty policy tools; (3) a lack of trust between network actors and; (4) a lack of control over resources.

Because Oracle Team USA, considered the San Francisco team, won the 34th America’s Cup, San Francisco had hoped to host the 35th America’s Cup. However, the next event will be held in Bermuda in 2017, which fueled speculation and brought into question San Francisco’s ability to improve on its 2013 effort. By detailing the missteps in the network, the paper argues that by increasing network centrality, promoting information sharing and including more workarounds (David Campbell 2012), the America’s Cup could improve its efficiency and effectiveness for future America’s Cup events both here and abroad.

WHAT IS THE AMERICA’S CUP?
The America’s Cup is one of the oldest international sporting competitions and holds the distinction of being the world’s premier yacht racing event. Its first competition was held in 1851 in Cowes, England between the America yacht, representing the New York Yacht Club, and the Royal Yacht, representing the British crown. When America won the trophy, the owners of the yacht “donated the trophy to the New York Yacht Club under a Deed of Gift, which stated that the trophy was to be a perpetual challenge cup for friendly competition between nations...Thus was born the America’s Cup, named after the winning schooner America, as opposed to the country” (America’s Cup, n.d.).

The competition evolved, with winners represented throughout the globe. In 1970, more than one yacht challenged the America’s Cup winner, leading to the Challenger Series, which determines the challenger for the final race and give the subsequent challenger team sufficient competition and race practice.

The modern America’s Cup final is preceded by two events: the America’s Cup World Series, a two season series whose challengers accrue points that will help their ranking in the Challenger Series (formerly the Louis Vuitton Cup) and the Challenger Series. In 2010, BMW Oracle Racing (now named Oracle Team USA), under the Golden Gate Yacht Club of San Francisco (GGYC), won the 33rd America’s Cup in Valencia, Spain. Under the Deed of Gift, the GGYC had the authorization to organize the 34th America’s Cup and choose the host city.

Later that year, the City created a proposal to bid for San Francisco as the venue for the 34th America’s Cup, as well as all the stages of the Event, which include the America’s Cup World Series Pre-regatta in 2011 and 2012, the America’s Cup Challenger Series, the America’s Cup Defender Series (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010a, p. 10).

THE SAN FRANCISCO WATERFRONT
In 2011, Governor Jerry Brown signed Assembly Bill 664, introduced by Assemblyman Tom Ammiano, a democrat of San Francisco, to allow “San Francisco to form special waterfront infrastructure financing districts for [the America’s Cup]” (p. 1) and “removes the vote requirement to form a district, issue bonds, and set the appropriations limits” (p. 10). The bill initiated the privatization of the waterfront revitalization, bringing much needed capital to the piers. San Francisco has a rich maritime history, however: “Over the last thirty years, as the City’s downtown grew towards the water’s edge, new uses established themselves in previously industrial areas. The Port today oversees a myriad of maritime, commercial and public activities... Cruise ships, excursion boats, passenger ferries, recreational boating, commercial and sport fishing activities and other commercial maritime operations remain on the northern waterfront...” (“History ”, n.d.).

As San Francisco began to diversify its economy away from shipping, the pier attracted new industries, but were unable to sustain them as the waterfront was slowly falling into disrepair. The Port evicted businesses from certain locations like...
Pier 38 due to “significant electrical, plumbing and structural issues discovered by city engineers during a recent round of inspections” (“Pier 38,” 2011). The City worked with the Bay Area Council Economic Institute (BACEI) and Beacon Economics on an economic study that projected the race series would generate $1.4 billion in economic activity, “primarily through expenditures by racing syndicates, and through spending on hotels, restaurants, and retail and other services by both domestic and overseas visitors and Bay Area residents” (BACEI & Beacon Economics, 2010, p. 1). In addition to increased economic activity, the report also promised an “increase in employment...on the order of 8,840 jobs” (p. 1).

By bidding to host the 34th America’s Cup, the City hoped to use the revenue and renewed interest in the pier to revitalize and modernize the waterfront.

**ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NETWORK THEORY**

**DEFINING THE NETWORK: DECENTRALIZED & UNDIFFERENTIATED**

With the promise of a robust economic benefit, the City, ACEA and America’s Cup Organizing Committee (ACOC) entered into a contractual agreement to bid for San Francisco as the host city for the 34th America’s Cup. The ACEA is considered a limited liability company (LLC) comprised of the GGYC and BMW Oracle Team, owned by Oracle CEO Larry Ellison. The ACOC was “organized and exists for public and charitable purposes to foster national and international amateur sports competition...particularly to assist in securing and conducting AC34 in San Francisco...” (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010a, p. 1). The contract further defines the City and County of San Francisco as a municipal corporation. The legal contract granted the ACEA and the City shared decision making responsibilities for the other respective private and public organizations involved, mainly the GGYC and the America’s Cup Race Management, an organization that managed the regatta formats and set the race rules for all the races of the 34th America’s Cup. The GGYC “appointed the [ACEA] and the America’s Cup Race Management (ACRM)...to organize and manage” the 34th America’s Cup (p. 1). However, as designed the network was undifferentiated and relied on strong ties. The GGYC authorized both the ACEA and the ACRM to “organize and manage” the event (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010a, p.1), making it ambiguous as to which was assigned to which task. The ACOC was also charged with “securing and conducting the AC34 in San Francisco...” (pp.1). With the organizations having similar functions and specialties, they formed strong ties, undercutting the importance of weak ties as “primary sources of new ideas and information” (Gormley & Balla, 2013, p. 162). A vice president of global public relations firm Hill + Knowlton Strategies, handled marketing communications for the ACEA. When asked if she believed one party should shoulder the full burden of the ineffectiveness, she emphasized, “...there were several organizations responsible for this event, including the America’s Cup Organizing Committee and the America’s Cup Event Authority. The ACEA specifically has not put on a large scale event like this in the U.S. in some time, and I actually feel the lack of SF expertise was the biggest barriers. Sailing simply is not what it is in Europe in the U.S.” (Personal communication, November 13, 2013). The strong ties prevented the network from seeking new information from outside sources, leading to missing local knowledge.

Gormley and Balla (2013) suggest that “larger networks find it desirable or necessary to route communications through one organization or subunit” (p.163). While only the City, ACOC and ACEA entered the contract, the nuances of the America’s Cup rules and regulations created unclear communications channels, creating a large, decentralized network. The contract named both the ACEA and ACRM as joint decision makers, but did not delineate which organization was charged with relaying the information to the GGYC, ACOC and the City. Since the GGYC made the ACEA and ACRM proxies for decision making, would that mean the GGYC should have been the communication hub, as the “choice of host city will be made by GGYC, in its sole discretion?” (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010a, p. 2). From its inception and design, the network exhibited flaws which would manifest itself in the decreased economic benefit and waterfront revitalization efforts.

**THE INITIAL PLAN: FAULTY TOOLS**

As Gormley and Balla (2013) suggest, “network accountability and performance depend not only on the organizational characteristics of the networks…but also on the characteristics of the policy tools that undergird networked arrangements” (p. 165). The following section will outline how the network’s choice of financial incentives and environmental regulation ultimately affected the performance of the network. The first contract proposed in November 2010 included many real estate and financial incentives, to help sway the ACEA to choose San Francisco as the host city. The ACEA would have “exclusive possession and control of Pier
28, Piers 30-32, Seawall Lot 330, Pier 48, and Pier 50 as the long-term Venues for the Event” (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010a, p. 11). The incentives would replace decrepit and abandoned buildings with the America’s Cup public area, including an entertainment stage, theater seating, food and beverage vendors, and the America’s Cup museum.

The largest incentive of the plan being the leasing of “various Port properties, free of charge, to the Event Authority for 66 to 75 years, and allow the Event Authority to develop such property with the City and County of San Francisco charging no rent to the Event Authority for the term of the leases” (Rose, 2010, p. 2). Presumably, the privately controlled and maintained piers would help rejuvenate the pier, at no expense to the city.

In exchange, the City expected the “Authority or the Authority Affiliates will expend $150,000,000 or more in both hard and soft costs of performing the Infrastructure Work for which the Authority is responsible,” which included infrastructure work on Piers 30-32 and Pier 50 like pile replacements, substructure strengthening, and any and all repairs and improvements to other facilities needed for the event. In order to finalize the agreement, the contract relies on its own legal validity and financial incentives, as well as environmental regulation: “The parties acknowledge that the City’s approval of the Event is subject to environmental review required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and the reservation of discretion that is required in connection with that review” (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010a, p. 2).

While environmental sensitivity is part of the stated goals, “the Event will be organized in a manner, and take place under conditions, that...[emphasize] resource sustainability and environmental stewardship in the staging of the Event” (p. 2), “information sharing” (Gormley & Balla, 2013, p. 199) should have been considered another tool for the network to meet its goals. As Gormley and Balla (2013) suggest, “information is an especially potent policy tool when it is combined with other instruments such as...the threat of government regulation” (p. 201). This type of competitive sailing and its effect on the environment may not be well known outside of elite sailing circles. By offering to share more information about the sport, the network could have provided environmental groups and journalists with valuable information” (p. 200) to help them meet their environmental goals. Additionally, when asked about the success of the event in meeting media outreach and awareness, the Hill + Knowlton executive says “the communications strategy was incredibly flawed and the lack of a strong communications and marketing budget was a big miss for the event. The organization spent too much money, too far out and then was left with little budget. Their approach was way too reactive instead of proactive” (Personal communications, November 13, 2013). If a stronger communications strategy were implemented, for both the media and community, the public and other stakeholders would have been able to contribute to the final event.

THE NORTHERN WATERFRONT: TRUST ISSUES

According to a letter from the ACEA to the City and State actors, they were not asked to be a part of the planning process that introduced the Northern Waterfront plan: “We were surprised and disappointed to then be advised on December 1st...of a new Northern Pier alternative Host city Agreement, an agreement we had no involvement in preparing. The Event Authority has been advised that this was done to resolve the impact on the City and Port’s finances, however no one asked the Event Authority how it impacted its finances” (S. Barclay, personal communication, December 10, 2010).

The major change in the plan not only affected network trust, but also placed the financial incentives for the private entities at risk. According to Harvey Rose, the City’s budget analyst (2010), the total cost to the city would be $128.3 million, including the long term venue leases, would cost the city $128.3 million (p. 1-2). The high public cost forced the City to renegotiate to keep the network contractually bound. In addition to moving the events to the northern waterfront, closer to other tourist attractions like Fisherman’s Wharf, the new plan removed the long term venue lease for Pier 50, but still included the “exclusive possession and control of Pier 26, Pier 28, Piers 30-32, and Seawall Lot 330 as the long-term Venues for the Event” (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010b, p. 12). Instead of events being centered at Piers 30-32, the new plan called for Piers 27-29 to be developed for the event, and then used in the future as a cruise terminal. Additionally, the expected cost from the ACEA was lowered from $150 million to “$55 million or more in both hard and soft costs...” (p. 18).

The City made drastic changes to the terms of the network, without consulting the
other actors, breaching their trust. Additionally, the City only conducted “vertical communications” (Gormley & Balla, 2013, p. 222) and failed at horizontal communication, keeping all relevant information only to intergovernmental agencies and not its private partners, actively shrinking the event’s effect on the city and waterfront.

**SCALING DOWN THE NORTHERN WATERFRONT-RESOURCE DEPENDENCY**

The unreliable resource streams of sponsorship and private dollars and event attendance further weakened the network. According to the San Francisco Business Times, the original plan anticipated 5.4 million attendees, which was then amended in March 2012 to only 2.2 million to 3.6 million (Young, 2012). The network could not control the diminishing interest in the event, failing to meet its goal of drawing the “widest possible audience for the Event” (The City and County of San Francisco, 2010b, p.2).

Additionally, the ACOC was to lead the fundraising to help the City offset any costs and was given the task of procuring “Event Sponsors who, pursuant to sponsorship agreements between the Authority and the Event Sponsors, will provide sponsorship revenue of not less than $270 million to support the Event...” (pp.31). While many organizations promised to meet monetary milestones, the ACOC had no control over the external economic climate or sponsorship environment to meet those goals.

As resources dwindled, as did the impact the event had on the San Francisco waterfront. Following the shrinking resource pool, in February 2012, the City and the ACEA announced, “a consolidated venue plan for the 34th America’s Cup, removing Piers 30-32 for use during the America’s Cup events, consolidating all racing teams at Pier 80 and build a race village at Pier 27-29,” (Office of the Mayor, 2012, n.d.), effectively removing the long term development leases from the contract.

In August 2012, the deal was finalized and Mike Martin, the America’s Cup project director for San Francisco’s Office of Economic and Workforce development confirmed the loss of the leases to NBC Bay Area stating, “The long-term development pieces fell away, now we’re focused on the event...development rights for Piers 26, 28, and Seawall Lot 330 have been removed from the plan” (America’s Cup Plan, 2012).

**CONCLUSION**

No single organization could organize and execute the 34th America’s Cup alone and a network was necessary to handle a wide range of activities, but the combination of faulty tools, lack of trust among network members and uncontrollable resources lead to a network that operated inefficiently and was ineffective. The failure of the network manifested itself in the diminished waterfront revitalization efforts, impacted event attendance, and created discord between the public and private entities involved. However, without the network, San Francisco may not have been chosen as the host city, and construction on the Pier 27 ferry terminal may not have yet begun. Many citizens saw the event as an overall success. When asked about the success of the event Quattrini stated, “In short, yes. While the event may not have lived up to expectations originally set by event organizers, it did bring in more than one million people to San Francisco. The event was also responsible for waterfront developments like the new Cruise Ship Terminal and ORACLE Team USA’s comeback was a great time in history for sailing enthusiasts and beyond” (Personal Communication, November 13, 2013).

The network had yet to alleviate the cost to the city. According to Katherine Fong (2013), a local National Public Radio (NPR) affiliate, even Mayor Ed Lee “acknowledged...that the races have not drawn as much interest or economic impact as originally predicted.” He continued saying that “private fundraising efforts to offset San Francisco’s costs for the races have fallen short, leaving the city currently on the hook for around $4 million from its general fund...[which] could end up going down, since the city’s costs have also not been as large as previously planned due to the lower turnouts.”
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The America’s Cup Event Authority, San Francisco America’s Cup Organizing Committee, and The City and County of San Francisco. (2010, December). 34th America’s Cup Host City and Venue Agreement. Retrieved from http://oewd.org/media/docs/AC34/12.31%20docs/HOST%20CITY%20AGREEMENT%20FULLY%20EXECUTED%202012.12.31.pdf
The way people interact with urban space often depends on their familiarity with it. Whether or not someone can identify as a resident or as a tourist plays into comfort levels with those around them and in the way they interact with new surroundings. A popular tourist destination in San Francisco is Pier 39, located off of Jefferson Street, just south of Fisherman’s Wharf. Pier 39 offers attractions, restaurants, tours, shopping outlets and events throughout the year. The way to tell if someone is a tourist or a local is based on their behavior within urban space, specifically through collecting memorabilia, seeking instant gratification by seeing place after place and generally travelling within a group, family or as a couple.

The definition of a tourist within this essay is based on behavior. I set out to Pier 39 on October 5th around noon to observe how tourists interact within this carefully planned and manicured space. The psychology of tourism influenced my observations, for I set out to observe behaviors that could be directly linked to a psychological need or want. By basing what I observed on Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs – physiological, safety, love/belonging, self-esteem and self-actualization, I could...
observe what the businesses located on Pier 39 specifically provide as well as identified what motivation tourists may have for visiting or doing certain things. Tourists go to places to create new memories, be apart of a new environment and to experience new places, cultures and attitudes (Simkova, 2014).

THE SITE
Pier 39 was built as a tourist location and has only gained visitors since its initial opening in 1989. On Pier 39 there are many attractions for people to see and take part in, such as Aquarium of the Bay, Carousel, street performers, tours, and the famous sea lions sunbathing on the docks. Pier 39 is on 75% of people’s itineraries when they visit San Francisco (SF Travel Association, 2014). There is a range of restaurants, from candy stores and sweets, to beer, wine tasting and expensive seafood, catering to all ages and tastes. There is a range of stores with souvenirs and little knick-knacks people can buy for themselves, friends and family. Each business caters to a specific demographic, fulfilling different needs with different services. The restaurants and snack shops fulfill our basic needs, our physiological needs of hunger, thirst, clothing and new experiences. The clothing shops fulfill our need to be protected from the elements. The food and the clothing being sold are branded in a certain way, meant to draw people in by providing them with “authentic San Francisco style clam-chowder” and through the sale of San Francisco-specific clothing motifs – Alcatraz Island, Pier 39, Fisherman’s Wharf, Coit Tower, the Bay Bridge, etc. Every business or attraction on Pier 39 is designed to fill a need, both real – need for food and shelter - and cultural – sense of belonging within San Francisco.

The pier was designed with two levels, allowing for a mix of both restaurants and shops with a large walkway through the middle and along the edge facing the bay. At the end of the pier and in the center of the walkway is the carousel and stage where street performers do their acts. There are small vendors along the sides selling coffee, soda and snacks. Seating is in the middle of the walkway and occasionally to the side in the shade. The seats in the middle of the promenade are scarcely occupied for they are directly in the flow of traffic and sunlight. The overall environment is very busy. With families and children from many different places, many of which trying to navigate the small walkway with strollers or elderly, it is easy to get sucked into a surge of people moving forward to no destination in particular.

The people who go to Pier 39 are generally there to partake in tourist activities or to provide them. The pier attracts people from all around, for international and national tourists of all age groups visit it. The pier is a good place for children, adults and elderly as it provides activities for every age group. The paths are handicap-accessible and wide enough for strollers, allowing for anyone to visit and enjoy. Most of the people observed traveled in groups, ranging from 4-7 people, and often had small or young children with them. The pier is a good place for residents to bring families that are visiting, for it has the feeling of a fun-fair or boardwalk, condensed into a 45-acre plot on the bay. The site offers views of the Golden Gate bridge, Angel Island, Alcatraz Island, and Bay Bridge. Due to its location next to the F-line train, it is easily accessible and is close to other popular tourist spots, like Chinatown, downtown, and the Embarcadero. The environment and feeling of the pier almost evokes a childlike feeling of curiosity, providing a busy environment and many distractions to be explored.

SWARM
The families and couples that come to Pier 39 all seemed to follow the same footwork and patterns, exhibiting herd-like behavior. The flow of traffic was steady, moving at a slower pace than I was used to in the city. With people observing the shops, restaurants and other tourists, it was common for people to stop in the middle of road and cause some confusion for those around them. Pier 39 is by no means organized or punctual, for people are on their own schedules or have none. The environment appears a bit chaotic at first, yet upon observation I noticed that there was order amongst the picture snapping public.

Adults were more likely to move with a crowd, follow the same patterns and exhibit herd or swarm-like behavior. Many times I saw people point to a shop, look at a friend or family member and make a beeline straight in without question. The number of children there on Saturday afternoon only enhanced the busy atmosphere, for they made unpredictable paths through the scenery, though they are drawn to very predictable places. Children moved more sporadically, often against the crowd and were more likely to beeline to specific sites they found interesting. The “swarming” of people throughout Pier 39 was easily observed. People moving in groups would flock together, each following the same motion and stream. People go where they see others go. Humans evolved to
follow and lead, still exhibiting the same tribe-like instincts.

When presented with an attraction, such as the street performers on Pier 39 in the center-square as well as along Jefferson Street, people gather in steady numbers. When the street performers began their show, the seats in front began filling with families. Those in smaller groups tended to stand on the sides and back. 15 minutes into the show and the number had risen from around 10 people to 75 people, mostly families or couples. After the street performers ended their set, the crowd scattered and re-formed in small groups. This behavior is much like that exhibited by flocking birds. The sudden change of direction, clustering, scattering and reforming can be easily viewed in humans on an individual and group scale. However, humans are not motivated by the same force that flocks of birds or schools of fish are. “Birds and fish adjust their physical movements to avoid predators, seek food and mates, optimize environment parameters, etc. Humans adjust not only physical movement but cognitive and experiential variables as well. We do not usually walk in step and turn in unison...; rather, we tend to adjust our beliefs and attitudes to conform with those of our social peers” (Kennedy, Eberhard 1995).

TRINKETS
Tourists collect memorabilia from new places in the form of pictures, souvenirs and caricatures documenting a time and place. The collection of memorabilia and site-specific souvenirs can be seen as fulfilling our need of belonging, for collecting a souvenir proves they went there, experienced it and have physical evidence. Their sense of belonging to that location, specifically Pier 39 in this case, may make them feel more apart of the local culture, creating a bond between them and the location. When we go to new places, we set out to observe all the major sites and go to all the little stores that catch our eye. This sense of longing and adventure is socially motivated, for it gives us a chance to meet new people and harness new experiences. “According to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, tourism can satisfy some people's social needs, such as identity, sense of belonging, and respect from others” (Liu, 2013). Experiencing a new place with family members or by oneself can increase one's sense of belonging within that group, and may increase one's sense of belonging with San Francisco, for they become more familiar with the location and attitudes/culture of the city. By visiting popular tourist location, there is a sense of validation. This validation is furthered through the consumption of souvenirs, for they say, “I've been here,” and further validates the sense of belonging within a location.

The types of activities people did and where they went turned out to be very predictable. Children went to places that were specifically designed to garner their attention; adults went to places that were designed for their larger sphere of interest. Activities and places for children were often frequented (not particularly by choice) and enjoyed by adults. Children became increasingly bored with sitdown restaurants and large specialty stores, as children do in their everyday atmosphere, though their curiosity piqued when entering the numerous knick-knack or souvenir stores, ranging in focus from Alcatraz Island and the Aquarium to a small shop “Fairyland” themed shop and a magic store. People go to these places to buy things, for themselves, their children or their friends and family. We, as a culture, believe it is very important to collect memorabilia to prove or show that we have been somewhere. This can be seen with the knick-knacks and cheesy souvenirs people buy, the photos they take, and the things they chose to do while in a space. People collect memorabilia to remember their trips and through allowing others to join them in the experience through the viewing of photographs and video. By sharing our experience, we validate it and validate our sense of belonging in that space and with the people we chose to share our experience with.

As stated before, a tourist can be spotted by the behavior in which they exhibit in new surroundings. Along with behavior comes an attitude that is very different from that of an average San Franciscan and pretty easy to pick out in a crowd. Tourists are in new surroundings to experience new places, they are not affected by the monotony that residents begin to experience day-to-day because San Francisco has a different atmosphere and feel that draws people from all over in. The city is a fascinating place to experience and be in with a different feel than you could ever find in New York or Los Angeles. They do not exhibit the blasé attitude Simmel wrote about, for they do not know what to view with indifference and what to pay attention to (1903). Tourists seem to find everything interesting, from the street signs we ignore daily to the most famous streets we may frequent in our spare time. Both tourists and those who have just moved to San Francisco exhibit this new and fresh attitude.
Tourists are an interesting phenomena within cities, and the space that they frequent is inherently changed to adapt to them. Pier 39 was a space specifically constructed to attract and amuse tourists. It has all the necessities and perks that tourists are looking for, complete with the feeling of a natural boardwalk. It does not feel forced and has become a natural place within the city. People interact with the space differently than they act within rest of the city, for it creates a childlike atmosphere, engulfing its visitors in new sights and smells. The space fills our needs, validates our trips and provides a sense of belonging for visitors.

When I first moved to San Francisco, I went to Pier 39 during Fleet Week by chance. Coming from Los Angeles, I have been to Disneyland more times than I can count, and the feeling of Pier 39 reminded me a lot of that atmosphere which they created. Pier 39 is inherently designed towards children, much as Disneyland is, yet still caters to the needs and wants of adults. Anyone can have fun there and leave happy (though with much less money than they came in with). During the busy Saturday afternoon I observed, I was sucked into the crowd and went where they went. I saw what they saw and I watched them. I was initially captured with a feeling of whimsy that the space was giving off. Places intentionally designed for tourism have a basic feeling: they create a feeling of wonder, of curiosity that is often only felt in similar places. Pier 39 and Disneyland have many differences, yet the feeling I got while occupying them was much the same. People go to tourist locations to be entertained by the things they offer and by the people around them. There is unexpected joy in snapping a photograph of a friend or family member somewhere and sharing it with people you know. There is unexpected happiness in buying a cheesy souvenir and giving it to someone you think just might appreciate it. Places designed for tourism do not create these feelings for everyone, yet when the atmosphere is right and the air is filled with children laughing, it easier to feel happiness and peace within a city you do not know and with a place you are unfamiliar.

REFERENCES


Progressive laws reducing racial profiling and discrimination have found wide support in California, yet in San Francisco, African American populations are migrating away in record numbers. This raises some important questions about how effective anti-racism policies and sentiments are in actually integrating the Black segment of a population. This report attempts to take the first step toward answering that question by looking at what locations have characteristics associated with segregation, and how that has changed between the 2000 and 2010 U.S. censuses. Locations with different integration or hypersegregation changes for Black populations over the ten year period provide a starting point for examining qualitative elements of the location, like policies and built infrastructure. In addition to San Francisco, Los Angeles has had significant struggles against institutionalized racism, so the Major Metropolitan area of both cities are analyzed (Davis, 1992).

A hypersegregated community is identified in a location having high levels of multiple segregation factors at the same time (Massey, 1988). Multiple types of segregation must be calculated and measured to identify these locations. Xenophobia and racism are legacies of the United States, and are still starkly visible in most analyses of populations of people of color. Different communities have different sentiments toward race within their local population, and those sentiments are related to how integrated or segregated a community grows.
CONCEPT
Massey and Denton created the term hypersegregation, a phenomenon that is found most commonly in African American and Hispanic populations (Massey, 1988). It is an embodiment of overt xenophobia and racism, but can also be a result of institutional and racism over several generations. Segregation factors can be used to identify populations that are neglected by society at large. Why do Hispanic and African American citizens of the U.S., even after several generations, often live in isolated communities with poor access to jobs, amenities, and resources?

It is important to note that this analysis will provide data on which localities seem to have a lower level of hypersegregation, but will be unable to tell us why. This information is useful to identify locations of interest. Further study could be done in those locations to determine what factors contribute to low levels of isolating conditions in the population.

PROCESS
Based on Massey and Denton’s study, three indexes were chosen and calculated from U.S. Census Bureau data from 2000 and 2010: Dissimilarity, Evenness, and Isolation. These indexes were combined to create a segregation Metascore. See Appendix A for variables used and Appendix B for calculations.

The values were translated to a choropleth to identify the distribution of communities with notably high segregation factors. Several locations of concern were found both in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The series of maps can be found in Results A.

Using ArcMap, a spatial join was used to create a layer showing where the greatest changes occurred. This layer compared 2000 metascore values against 2010 metascore values. The analysis showed a wide range or results, showing locations with notable success in counteracting segregation, and locations with worrying increases in levels of segregation. The series of maps can be found in Results B.

A dummy variable was created using a score of greater than or equal to 4 showing increasing segregation and a value less than 4 showing stasis or decline in segregation, then another dummy variable was created using a score of less than or equal to -4 showing decreasing segregation, and a value greater than 4 showing stasis or increasing segregation. These dummy variables indicate locations with significant metascore change. Those locations warrant investigation. Further studies could identify factors present in these locations that are atypical to surrounding areas. The series of maps can be found in Results C.

OUTCOMES
Results provided a more quantitative version of segregation in California. Los Angeles and San Francisco Metropolitan Areas both have problems with segregated communities. Racial groups keeping to themselves is result a push or a pull factor from other elements of the society. Migrant enclaves frequently form as a source of support for newly arrived citizens, but most African American citizens have lived in the United States for several generations. The continued existence of racial enclaves is a phenomenon that should be concerning. The results of the tests applied here indicate segregation against African Americans exists, and further, locations where segregation should be of particular concern are identified.

RESULTS A
REFERENCES

APPENDIX A: VARIABLES
All variables were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau years 2000 and 2010.
Linguistic isolation, census tract level (P020 SF3, 2000; P020 SF3, 2010)
African American population total, census tract level (P003 SF1, 2000; P003 SF1, 2010)
White population total, census tract level (P003 SF1, 2000; P003 SF1, 2010)
Linguistic isolation, census tract level (P020 SF3, 2000)

APPENDIX B: CALCULATIONS
Variables
n = total population in state
t = total population within a single unit of analysis (census tract)
W = total White population in state
B = total Black population in state
w = white population within a single unit of analysis (census tract)
b = black population within a single unit of analysis (census tract)

Dissimilarity
A dissimilarity index measures the proportion of a group’s population that would have to change residence to match the proportions of the population, overall (Dempsey, 1988).
Statewide dissimilarity was calculated using
\[ \frac{1}{5} \sum |b/B - w/W| \]
Individual tract dissimilarity was calculated using
\[ \frac{1}{5} |b/B - w/W| \times (n-1) \]
Values range from 0 to 10, with 10 showing maximum dissimilarity.

Evenness
An evenness index measures the relative abundance of groups of people in an area, quantifying how diverse and evenly varied elements of a community are. This score was calculated using Simpson’s Diversity Index, a calculation to measure evenness in species.
Statewide evenness was calculated using
\[10 \times \frac{b}{t^2}\]
Individual tract evenness was calculated using
\[10 \times \sum \frac{b}{t^2}\]
Values range from 0 to 10, with 0 showing maximum evenness.

**Isolation**

An isolation index measures the difference in proportions between a unit of analysis’ population and that of a typical minority population’s neighbors that are also the same minority.

Statewide isolation was calculated using
\[\sum \frac{(b - B) \times \frac{b}{t}}{10}\]
Individual tract isolation was calculated using
\[n \times \frac{(b - B) \times \frac{b}{t}}{10}\]
Community is defined as a group of people with common affiliations (Pyles, 2009). This paper will discuss the social health and wellness benefits of community gardens to urban neighborhoods, looking at San Francisco, California as a case study. San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department (SF Park & Rec) displays 38 community gardens on their website as of March 2015 (Sfrecpark.org, 2015). Community gardens are parcels of land usually owned by government or nonprofit organizations for city residents to take part in the growing trend of urban agriculture. Each parcel of land is divided into individual garden plots for locals to cultivate homegrown fruits, vegetables, and flowers. Expertise, purpose, and presentation vary from garden to garden in San Francisco. These gardens supplement nutritional needs, provide a recreational outlet, and encourage social interactions between diverse social groups, all of which benefit and uplift the greater community (Glasner, 1987).
Target demographics for community gardens are primarily public housing residents, school-age children, the elderly, and disabled—essentially populations that have a vested interest in community gardening. These demographics tend to have the most urgent needs, and necessitate eclectic life-enhancement techniques due to location and resources available to them. They are generally considered the most at risk members of the community and benefit greatly from the proceeds of new community gardens.

**CRIME PREVENTION & COMMUNITY ORGANIZING – BROOKS PARK**

The “Community Garden Master Plan” published by the San Francisco League of Urban Gardeners in 1986 states that community gardens should ideally be located based upon these four principles:

1. Identifying user groups such as seniors, low-income households, school children, and residents of high-density neighborhoods;
2. Plotting existing community gardens and service areas with regards to the distance in which prospective users are willing to travel to reach each community garden;
3. Deducing where user groups remain underserved by already existing gardens and;
4. Using a cost-benefit analysis that shows the economic and social assets produced by each garden (Elmstrom, 1986).

When operating an organization made up of various group members, values, and strengths—issues and problems within the community are bound to arise. Having a database where data can be recorded and readily available to the public is a key component to the smooth operation of successful community gardens.

Peter Vaernet, the Community Garden Coordinator at Brooks Park in San Francisco, provided some insights from his gardening experience. Vaernet noted that the essential purpose of the park is a native plant wilderness refuge, which preserves and enhances the native wildlife drawn to the park by the presence of native plants and a hilly, rocky terrain (Vaernet, 2013). Additionally, on the east side of the park a one-acre community garden and adjacent asphalted area used for Tai Chi serve as community-gathering hotspots (Brookspark.org, 2015). With outdoor recreation offerings of Tai Chi classes, ping pong, badminton, and racquet ball tournaments, the park has much to offer for a wide variety of individuals. The many vegetated areas of the park are managed by the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department's Natural Areas Program (NAP). Sandstone rock walls originally are constructed by the Brooks family surround the central interior of the park. San Francisco Recreation & Park gardeners manage this section of garden, but have received assistance from the local neighborhood residents (Vaernet, 2013).

While interviewing Lonnie Lawson, a resident of the Ocean View/Merced Heights/Ingleside (OMI) neighborhood, he stated, “unless you have one or more neighbors serving as a catalyst, every city park will have rough times” (Lawson, 2013). This sentiment is due to the fact that many parks are open spaces that are unable to shut down after hours and keep unwanted individuals out after dark. In the past, Brooks Park has had a history and stigma of being a dangerous park and neighborhood. “The 1980s brought crack cocaine to the OMI, and Brooks Park became a haven for drug dealing. At least two bodies were dumped up on the hill until the old driveway was blocked off, and in the early 1990s came the new ‘sport’ of illegal pit bull fighting (Vaernet, 2013). Neighbors saw the shadowy figures leading the animals into the park at night, and in the morning often found the carcasses of losing dogs. Seriously wounded pit bulls bred to be aggressive and dangerous, would end up wandering and bleeding around the streets. People avoided the park and warned others about its dangers. Residents called the police, animal control, and SF Parks & Rec for assistance with resulting complaints. Nothing seemed to change at first, but some neighbors were determined to “make a difference” (LaBounty, 2003). Crime and instability were a major issue, and community members ended up not feeling safe in their neighborhood. The residents knew that something had to be changed, and bringing the community together and organizing as a whole was determined to be the only viable solution. The main idea was to include the productive community members and exclude the vice and criminals that were deteriorating the neighborhood (Vaernet, 2003).

Through years of hard work, community activists and members including Vaernet, were able to organize and reestablish the community integrity of the park and surrounding neighborhood by establishing a community garden. This dem-
onstrates the community’s resiliency, strength, and importance of community gardens and gathering areas.

Today, Brooks Park is more than just a place to come and grow vegetables. The park is used as a medium to bring residents out of their homes and create social interactions with neighbors that normally wouldn’t occur. As indicated by Mr. Vaernet, the Sisterhoods Farms at Brotherhood Way is a garden that serves as a dividing line between communities. One side of the park is a neighborhood predominantly occupied by Chinese immigrants and the other is comprised mostly of African-American residents. The Sisterhoods Farms community garden acts as an integration point of positive interaction between the two ethnic groups.

The community members who were determined to see change in their neighborhood linked up with a local resident and gardener named Minnie Ward. Minnie and her husband Louie were already in the midst of fighting similar issues in the community down the street. The Wards aided in establishing the community group Neighbors in Action (NIA). “The Wards were committed not to just eradicating the drug dealing in their neighborhood, but to providing the youth of the OMI neighborhood with alternative activities” (Glasner, 1987).

In 1986, Peter Vaernet moved to Shields Street, just two doors away from the park entrance. He saw all the problems going on, had bullets shot into his garage, watched drug deals out his living room window. But he also saw all the strengths of the area such as the beautiful views, the open space, and the good neighborly people around him. Peter wasn’t the type to lay-low and hope things would get better” (LaBounty, 2003). Peter immediately joined up with the Neighbors in Action community group to help tackle the problems in his neighborhood. “In addition to chasing off the drug deals and pit bull fights, other activities had to be programmed for Brooks Park to bring back the families – to “take back” the hilltop. Warriors from the past like Lonnie Lawson came back to the fight with new efforts. A new entryway and playground were installed, and crime task-forces worked with a neighborhood watch coalition to initiate the process. Practical ideas such as locking the Jose Ortega Elementary School’s gates afterhours, reduced the shady escape routes of the dealers” (Vaernet, 2003). Due to the persistence of community members, and major socioeconomic changes that continue to occur in San Francisco, Brooks Park no longer faces the major issues they used to deal with in the past decades.

THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY

Community organizing is never easy, and running a community garden is definitely no exception. Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) farms and community gardens are by nature democratic organizations which cater to their constituents. In a highly diverse city such as San Francisco, these concerns can vary dramatically and sometimes even oppose one another, highlighting the importance of systems for conflict resolution within these groups. A good example of this inaction can be taken from the meeting notes from a recent meeting of Howard Langton Community Garden on Howard Street. From a meeting dated 10/16/13, there were two key issues on the agenda that resulted in highly divided votes, one resulting in a one-vote margin of victory. These two issues were an increase in the amount of required workdays to become a member, and the establishment of a three-month probation period for new members. This was intriguing because it shows a sense of exclusionary protectionism from the senior members of the organization. When it comes to community gardens, this is reasonable as they are often temporary and there is high demand for plots, which fill up quickly. However, this does not detract from the fact that these additional burdens placed on new members are merely an exercise of oppression used by the senior members to keep their power over the newcomers (Howard Langton Community Garden, 2013).

Community gardens are also intriguing in that they expose and bring to light a lot of the underlying forces that determine how resources are allocated in our society. Some of the key parts central to this debate are the allocation, use, and perceived benefits of different types of land use in an urban area. The most obvious of these issues is land allocation. A city like San Francisco is densely built in most areas and known for its exorbitant property values, making it hard for community groups to secure adequate land for their gardening operations. This is clearly illustrated with the cases of Free Farm and Little City Gardens, both of which being located in San Francisco. Currently, these urban farms are living on borrowed time, and destined for closure because the property owners are putting the property on the real estate market to take advantage of skyrocketing real estate prices. “The original owner has sold the land. The farm is currently leas-
ing to a developer, who is in the process of drafting plans for the lot. As a result, Little City Gardens is operating on a month-to-month lease” (Smiechowski, 2013). Unfortunately, in the neoliberal world we live in, the power of money trumps the collective voices of the poor calling out for their right to food, community, and respect, as seen repeatedly throughout American cities.

The issue of community gardens getting evicted for higher payouts is indicative of the value system of society as a whole. Private property rights are a fact of modern law, maintaining that it is perfectly acceptable for a property holder to sell their holdings for maximum profit, even if it may negatively affect a large population. San Francisco has progressive reform laws to help mitigate these powerful capitalist forces, but as seen with the abuse of the Ellis Act, money often trumps morality. Urban farmers counter this by saying that CSA farms bring more value to the urban area than revenue for the city. Community, education, and empowerment are just as important as money, albeit harder to quantify. “Many community gardens have developed as a response to such issues as social exclusion and poverty, environmental degradation, increasing economic deprivation, or a response to growing concerns over food safety” (Holland, 2004). Since community gardens are a vector for marginalized people to organize and empower themselves, the systematic dismantling of these organizations by way of corporate buy-outs can be seen as an unjust exercise of power and oppression against the poor and already disenfranchised urban populations.

Since the debate surrounding urban agriculture in the city tends to revolve around the issue of productive use of land, other social and territorial disputes that often arise can get swept to the side. One case that attracted national attention is that of a community garden in Brooklyn, New York that got an extraordinary amount of pushback from neighbors when they started raising chickens. “The month-old dispute that has turned neighbor against neighbor in Brooklyn, has spawned petitions, door-to-door campaigns, and reams of fliers. There have been shouting matches, and even an intervention from a city councilman” (Yee, 2012). In this case, the feud was solved when representatives from both the community and the garden came together and held a vote to determine the fate of the chickens. This is a classic example of unexpected barriers to running a productive urban farm, but at its heart is really a story of democracy at its best.

TAX BREAKS & URBAN FARMING

Back in San Francisco however, land use is very much an issue. “On September 28, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the Urban Agriculture Incentive Zones Act (AB 551) which authorizes tax breaks for land-owners who lend their property to urban farmers” (The Huffington Post, 2015). Conceived by a Stanford University graduate student, and proposed to the state assembly by a representative from San Francisco, this urban agricultural bill has its roots in the Bay Area. In fact, one of the biggest organizers that rallied support for the bill was Little City Gardens, which saw it as an opportunity for them, and others to secure a long-term lease for their farms. This is an important first step that local CSA farms have taken towards making themselves heard politically. The fact that this bill was helped along from the beginning by small community gardens in San Francisco is a testament to the power of political organizing to get serious issues addressed. California Assembly Bill AB 551 is only a first step however – the futures of urban agricultural endeavors are still at the mercy of the county, city, and property owner. “Counties may opt in to the program but will not be required to do so. Similarly, private landowner participation will be completely voluntary” (FAQ: Urban Agriculture Incentive Zones Legislation AB 551, 2013).

This means that CSA farms such as Little City Gardens ultimately have no significant say in what happens to their land because the city might not adopt the measure, or the landowner simply might want to sell it. This is a prevalent and real issue, and can be seen as a threat to the democratic nature of community gardens, and the original intent of the assembly bill. However, there is redeeming quality that can be found in opportunities for increased dialogue between both parties. “Back at Little City Gardens, gardener and organizer Caitlyn Galloway, is uncertain whether the new law will improve her own situation, but she is optimistic about the possibilities it might open up. ‘It’s a small step forward,’ she says. ‘I can imagine this being a great motivator for a property owner who may not have ever considered a relationship with an urban farmer’” (Mazurek, 2015). From a community organizing standpoint, this is a significant victory because now these urban farmers can sit down at the negotiating table with something substantial to offer, thus increasing the resources for the land owner. The passage of AB 551 allows more flexibility for property owners in a heavily competitive housing market, and enables urban community gardens and agriculture to be a more realistic option for land owners in places such as San Francisco.
CONCLUSION

There are many encouraging things happening in the urban agricultural sector, especially with regards to community organizing and political action. Local community organizations that remain accountable to their constituents hold strong as a bastion of democracy in an increasingly undemocratic political environment. Politics aside, these groups provide a strong system of support and inclusion for members of the community, working to enhance the living conditions of those involved. Community supported agriculture provides a platform for neighbors to congregate and interact, giving residents (especially those of underserved or marginalized communities) a sense of place, purpose, and prosperity.

It is integral that community leaders and city planners realize the potential power of urban agriculture, and prioritize the creation of new gardens in neglected communities. Mr. Vaernet understood that even though he lived in a rough neighborhood, he saw its potential strengths, which now actively contribute to a successful and thriving community. Therefore, the allocation of ample land for future community parks and gardens is a necessity for future urbanites everywhere. Land is scarce in the small land mass at the end of a peninsula that makes up San Francisco, making the allocation of future gardens even more vital to the healthy growth of the city. It is of utmost importance for leaders in the community to essentialize the need for social interaction and wellness through the creation of new community gardens and green space. These urban green spaces are just as vital as other city-provided amenities, which serve as vital resources to healthy, successful neighborhoods and communities.

Community gardens represent optimism. An Optimism that new buds shall emerge; that new fruit is quietly ripening under a low hanging leaf or branch. When a community garden is allotted to a neighborhood and begins operation, it brings the feeling of sincere optimism – a sense of improvement and a path forward into a future of success and camaraderie. The power of optimism created by community interaction can single-handedly empower and uplift a neighborhood desperately in need. For all members of the community to be encouraged by such optimism, the goal of the community garden has been accomplished. Just as our friend Mr. Vaernet said to our co-author Nico De La Rosa, “a functioning park that remains to provide resources to the majority of the community, acts as the single greatest strength of a neighborhood” (Vaernet, 2013).

REFERENCES


This paper explores the tumultuous relationship between San Francisco and the graffiti that covers its walls through various media and literature. As the graffiti movement grew in popularity during the late 20th century, heated debate arose regarding its inherent nature. Is it a legitimate form of art or an act of vandalism? The city’s initial policy responses, such as the Matrix Program and Proposition 21 harshly penalized all forms of graffiti and refused the notion that this new cultural phenomenon was anything less than a childish activity with intimate ties to local gangs. Today, San Francisco recognizes graffiti as a complex, dynamic part of the urban landscape that has the ability to both vandalize and inspire depending on circumstance. Accordingly, measures like Where Art Lives and StreetsmARTS attempt to provide residents with simple tools to report vandals and educate youth on when and where graffiti is an appropriate form of art. Reports show that the implementation of these plans coincides with declining rates of vandalism via graffiti tagging and although the declination is slight, they provide evidence that these nuanced programs seem to be working.
HISTORY OF GRAFFITI IN SAN FRANCISCO

In order to understand graffiti culture, it is important to analyze the historical roots and the emergence of graffiti in San Francisco. The term “graffiti,” popularized by Raffaele Garrucci, author of Graffiti de Pompéi, is derived from the term graffiare, which means, “to scratch” or “to carve,” (Ganter, 2013). Illustrating life in antiquity, writers felt the need to express themselves through political or cultural messages. The birth of graffiti in San Francisco took place in low-income Hispanic neighborhoods. This form of art consisted of a sharp block-type font written by gangs, “announcing their affiliations to blocks and certain hoods,” (Hill, 2005). As the style began to change, influences from graffiti artists outside the Bay Area and the documentary film, Style Wars, made their way to San Francisco, bringing with them different artistic tastes and ideas of the art form. The innovations of new graffiti techniques expanded the “canvasses” from the traditional walls to other surfaces, such as buses and other modes of transportation.

GRAFFITI: ART VS. VANDALISM

As the rise of graffiti began to garner public attention, questions began to form regarding whether the craft should be labeled as an act of vandalism or a legitimate form of art. Today, this form of expression still inspires arguments surrounding its ambiguous classification.

Those who see graffiti as a work of art agree that it is not an act of destruction, but an integral part of the urban landscape that showcases visual expression. As with many forms of art, different styles of graffiti illicit different reactions. “Pieces” (short for “masterpieces”) are the most elaborate of the many styles of graffiti, consisting of what many consider more artistic value. “Tags,” on the other hand are “pseudonym signatures”, the simplest form of graffiti written on walls and in public places (Whitehead, 2004). Figure 1a and 1b shows the difference between tags and pieces. There is a correlation between the time and dedication of a piece and its artistic value as opposed to simply writing a name on a wall. From a graffiti writer's mind, the artist consider their work as art because “you’re [artist] thinking up your design...you’re putting a lot of effort into doing this [graffiti],” (Halsey and Young, 2006). While it does not take that much for a person to mindlessly write their name on a wall, it takes a lot more creativity and time to create an elaborate, meaningful piece.

However, a piece of art's value can neither simply be measured by the amount of time that was allotted to create it, nor how perceivably creative the artist behind it was. Its value, and subsequently its reception as art or vandalism, is largely derived from passerby perspectives. Abel and Buckley (1997) mentioned graffiti as “a form of communication that is both personal and free of everyday social restraints that normally prevent people from giving uninhibited reign to their thoughts.” To understand the art form, we must understand that the purpose of each writer's work is self-expression. Graffiti gives writers an alternative outlet for expressing emotions. However, while some consider graffiti a respected art form, others may feel differently.

Varnedoe and Gopnik (1991) considered graffiti, “a composite phenomenon, part childish prank, (and) part adult insult”. Since graffiti artists are comprised mostly of the youth, most adults see graffiti as childish, immature behavior, not to be taken seriously. Defacing both public and private properties, graffiti affects the city by interrupting businesses, ruining their properties, and costing business owners significant portions of their profit to remove. David Heller, an owner of a beauty supply shop, felt graffiti was an “assault on their livelihood,” claiming that a proper business should look “aesthetic… clean… professional” (Winn, 2013). Heller believes the façade of his beauty supply shop should attract customers, not scare them away. From an artist’s perspective, Paul Lanier, a muralist and ceramic artist at a San Francisco elementary school, claims that he does not consider graffiti an acceptable form of art. Lanier said, “Art inspires. Art beautifies. Graffiti is the opposite. It tears things down and makes places uglier,” (Winn, 2013).
PAST POLITICS

Following the notion that graffiti is an act of vandalism, public officials took action to put an end to what they considered a nuisance in the urban landscape of San Francisco. Under the leadership of Mayor Frank Jordan in 1993, the city introduced the Matrix Program. In an attempt to move the homeless off the streets, the program targeted many offenses such as “public drunkenness, public urination and defecation, trespassing, street sales of narcotics, dumping of refuse, graffiti, camping and lodging in public parks, and obstructing sidewalks,” (Macdonald, 1995). This plan called for police forces to raid the city one block at a time, eventually leading to the demise of Psycho City, a section of the city located on Market Street and Van Ness Avenue where graffiti artists were permitted to exercise their dexterity. Business owners who allowed graffiti artists to mark their buildings were threatened by Mayor Jordan to either stop permitting graffiti or have their businesses shut down (Hill, 2005). Following the loss of Psycho City, the graffiti movement shifted in a different direction. Illegal graffiti was taking the scene to a massive extent. Graffiti artists had nowhere to go and were pushed to find new locations to express their talent. Graffiti was everywhere from billboards, signs, pits, etc. In effect, this policy caused the city an even worse headache than it intended to alleviate.

A few years after Mayor Jordan’s proposal came into effect, Proposition 21 was passed in 1998. Proposition 21, also known as the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, resulted in increased severity of punishment against juveniles committing crimes. For example, any gang-member affiliated crimes would result in an automatic six-month prison sentence, even for small things such as under-aged drinking (Nieves, 2000). By this point, graffiti writers had started to form crews, such as T.W.S (Together with Style) or K.U.K (Kill Until Killed), which city officials labeled as gangs. As a result, graffiti writers would receive the same punishment that was being given to gang members. Proposition 21 included punishments towards vandalism as well. For graffiti artists, felony charges were given when damages incurred by the clean up of graffiti cost more than $400 (Nieves, 2000). The punishment did not match the crime. While officials thought that these approaches against graffiti and graffiti artists were effective, the attempt to take away their desire to create art was simply fueling the flames.

MOTIVATION AND INSPIRATION FOR GRAFFITI ARTISTS

With more restrictions to end this art form, came an even more rebellious outcry from the graffiti artist community in order to stand up for something they believe in. Artist felt compelled to react to policies that attempted to delegitimize their craft. One artist, Barry McGee, thinks of his work as a form of “striking back at injustice by any powerful institution, creating an instant dialogue that is carried out in action” (Dresecher, 1998). For many graffiti artists, art is the only way they know how to express themselves. Simply pressing a spray can on a wall says more than a signature, it sends a message to both the public and city officials. Halsey and Young (2006) understood graffiti to be an “affective process that does things to writers’ bodies (and the bodies of onlookers) as much as to the bodies of metal, concrete and plastic, which typically compose the surfaces of urban worlds.” Graffiti motivates the youth and other members of the city to pursue art movements. It sends a positive message, telling others to not be afraid to share their emotions. The Mission District of San Francisco has many displays of Latin-themed art in the predominantly Hispanic neighborhood. Exhibiting the diversity of San Francisco, graffiti demonstrates the different cultures present in the city. A staple to the urban setting, “graffiti is an urban fixture, as solid and integral to the street scene, in some ways, as the utility poles, retaining walls and street signs it adorns,” (Winn, 2013). Graffiti is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the city whether we agree with it or not, displayed everywhere from advertisements, billboards, and clothing. As a form of urban renewal, it represents, “an attempt to reclaim and energize a public space that is either soulless or cynically controlled by corporate advertisers,” (Winn, 2013).

“ZERO GRAFFITI FOR A BEAUTIFUL CITY”

In 2009, the San Francisco Department of Public Works introduced the “Zero Graffiti for a Beautiful City”, a zero tolerance campaign against graffiti. The government officials worked with multiple agencies around the city such as MUNI, the Recreation and Parks and School Districts to help eliminate graffiti tagging around the city such as schools, parks, and public transportation. Additionally, the Department of Public Works also joined forces with the residents of San Francisco to remove tags in their neighborhoods. This collaboration would help eliminate tagging throughout the city, while still accepting the artistic side of graffiti through murals.
Within the campaign are many components to strive for one common goal: to eliminate graffiti tagging in order to improve the city’s appearance. Residents and business owners are encouraged to report graffiti tagging to 3-1-1. Before this service, graffiti tagging was “underreported due to the more challenging process to report graffiti,” (Dillon, 2013). In addition to calling 311, the city made it easier for residents to help report graffiti by allowing them to simply take pictures to be emailed to the Department of Public Works so they could be forwarded to the San Francisco Police Department. Along with reporting tag sightings, came the pressure for businesses to take action compliance with the graffiti ordinance. Business owners were required to “remove graffiti within 30 days,” (Graffiti, 2013). Failure to do so would result in the business owners being fined. Transportation vehicles were also included in this campaign. The Clean and Green Trucks Pilot Program aimed to “reduce urban blight by abating commercial vehicles that bear graffiti,” (Graffiti, 2013). The purpose of this was to clean up the appearance of these tagged up commercial vehicles that would otherwise serve as “rolling billboards to promote and encourage graffiti vandalism” if left alone (Graffiti, 2013). Meanwhile, the city created programs, such as Where Art Lives and StreetsmARTS within the campaign that work with local artists to promote legal graffiti.

Cudmore (2012) explained that graffiti can be beneficial and act “as a form of ambiance that may open professionals to more participatory methods, deepening the quality of the city for the user.” Where Art Lives and StreetsmARTS have allowed exposure of legal graffiti and subsequently help bring compromise between artists and city officials. Both programs bring youth and graffiti artists together in order to provide education that exposes the negatives of tagging and conversely, how paint permissible pieces can help reduce vandalism.

Where Art Lives specifically promotes “the value of caring for public space and creating public art for the community,” (Graffiti, 2013). Educating the youth about the difference between graffiti art and graffiti vandalism would teach children to respect public spaces. The StreetsmARTS program allows graffiti artists to team up with private property owners who have permitted them to “create beautiful murals and deter tagging” (Graffiti, 2013). From working against the local government, to now cooperating with them, these writers helped both bring graffiti artists a better reputation and acceptance from the city as well as help redesign and bring beauty to the urban landscape of San Francisco.

With the help of these programs, graffiti art was able to gain popularity and acceptance amongst the public. The rise of its popularity slowly helped a decline in graffiti vandalism from the launch of the programs to present day.

CONCLUSION

After undergoing a turbulent history with the controversial issues surrounding it, graffiti is gaining acceptance and is starting to play a bigger role in the urban settings of San Francisco. Starting as a simple form of writing that marked gang territories, to a form of visual expression using dynamic artistic styles; graffiti has come a long way in the city. As it grew in popularity, so too did the question of how it should be categorized: as a legitimate form of art or a criminal act of vandalism. Opposing sides of this debate led to the creation of policies that challenged the legality of graffiti. These trials motivated graffiti artists to continue producing work, which inspired others to partake in this craft. Realizing that graffiti was never going to be forcibly removed from the city’s walls, San Francisco created programs like Where Art Lives and StreetsmARTS to take what was once considered a public annoyance, and turn it into something appreciable and constructive. Subsequently, graffiti vandalism declined in San Francisco. While this decline has only been slight, the city is hopeful that policies teaching the youth of San Francisco how to responsibly practice the art of graffiti along with a tolerant understanding of graffiti’s cultural importance will continue to improve the aesthetics of the urban landscape.
REFERENCES


LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

Figure 1a. Tags in San Francisco

Figure 1b. Pieces in San Francisco
Shanghai is a prime site of cultural production and reinterpretation in contemporary China. Its longstanding cultural and economic significance in representing a modern, secular hybrid culture manifests in remaking Chinese urban identity. Where the search for modernity is the zeitgeist of China since the 20th Century (Rofel 1992), Shanghai carries important socio-political implications in the discussion of Chinese modernity with its massive scale of development and global city aspiration. The city reflects China’s new socio-spatial reality and the state-inscribed urban vision to propagate China’s achievement of modernity. With the recent expansion of postcolonial studies, Shanghai’s experience of China’s urban reinvention affords a vast ideological terrain to reconceive the linear inquiries of modernity in the Chinese context. The historical and cultural sensitivities have evoked intellectual interest to deconstruct the metanarrative of the contemporary Chinese urbanism. This paradigm shift connects China with the global discourse of postmodernism to search for a new narrative of the Chinese urban reality and vision.
This paper delves into the ideological positions underneath the Chinese party-state construction of modernity and civility in Postsocialist Shanghai as a reflection of China postmodern urbanism. China’s urban development, arguably, is a state-led project that “purposefully inscribed a political discourse of modernity featuring a particular ideological telos of national destiny in the ‘social imaginary’ of space...make people believe that the yet-to-be-realized future is something that can be planned for” (Ho 2008). This is typified in Deng Xiaoping’s “two civilizations” program (liangge wenming, 兩個文明) proposed at the beginning of Economic Reform to “create an imaginary around the changes to come (Boutonnet 2011). The “two civilizations” program distinguishes material civilization (wu zhi wenming, 物質文明) and spiritual civilization (jing shen wenming, 精神文明), and conveys a clear association of modernity with civilization and civility. The idea of civilization (weming, 文明) has permeated the official rhetoric and institutional efforts as the “social imaginary of space”, in conjunction with an overarching discourse on “progress” that is subject to the political, economic, and cultural forces that accompanied technological developments (Ho 2008).

In more specific terms, this paper argues that Chinese postmodern urbanism is a complex of traditional, modern, and postmodern rationalities that seeks to reconcile radical paradigm shifts and socio-cultural ruptures. China’s preoccupation with progress and civilization, or wenming, in envisioning Shanghai, is a useful entry point to interrogate the discourse of Chinese postmodern urbanism in relation to China’s profound socioeconomic transformation. In the rest of the paper, I discuss the genealogy of the discourse of modernity and its implications to China, followed by the development of postmodernism in the Chinese intellectual and urban policy sphere. The examination of development of modernity and postmodernism shows the ideological terrain that shapes China’s urbanism. Then I look into the institutional efforts, national and local, to construct Shanghai as a leading civilized (wenming) city through various political and socio-cultural forces. Finally I relate this desire to establish a paradigmatic civilized, or modern, Chinese city back to the narrative of postmodernism to evaluate contemporary Chinese urbanism.

MODERNITY FRAMED

Modernity in a more restricted sense is a product of the European historical and cultural forces that generated the Enlightenment. It represents a universal finality of state building that shares the Western rationalities and values in an all-encompassing manner (Golden 2006). It bears a Euro-American rational cultural spirit that contains the familiar connotations of reason, enlightenment, science, contract, trust, subjectivity, individuality, freedom, self-consciousness, creativity, consciousness of social participation, etc (Yi and Fan 2006). As John Gray puts it, “the thinkers of the Enlightenment...never doubted that the future for every nation in the world was to accept some version of Western institutions and values. A diversity of cultures was not a permanent condition of human life. It was a stage on the way to a universal civilization. All such thinkers advocated the creation of a single worldwide civilization, in which the varied traditions and cultures of the past were superseded by a new, universal community founded of reason...[a] single global market is the Enlightenment’s project of a universal civilization in what is likely to be its final form” (1998).

Modernity, therefore, means a universalization of spirituality in reference to a specific sociohistorical context. It entails an organization composed of rational, enlightened individuals to orient themselves into a functional form within a planned space (Rabinow 1998). As the inherent mechanism of society and the schema of activity, modernity reveals itself in rationalized economic operation, bureaucratic administrative management, autonomous public sphere, and rationalized political civilization (Yi and Fan 2006). These aspects of modernity are linked to the context of Enlightenment and the ensuing critical junctures, i.e., industrialization and Imperialism. They constitute a Western centric category of modernity as a watershed to separate tradition and non-Western from modern and progress; and that the universal nature of such modernity and world view served to justify their economic and geopolitical conquests, including China.

MODERNITY IN CHINA: A DIFFERENT EXPERIENCE

The idea of modernity was introduced into China’s history and culture by the force of arms and unequal treaties provoking a traumatic experience that has lasted for more than a century and half. This historical condition of modernity signified memories of national humiliation in the nationalistic discourse that construct an inferior identity, which evolve into a Third World identity (Lu 2006). Such experience marked a fundamental difference from the Euro-American experience, resulting in a different overarching objective and the consequential structural changes. China’s contested quest for modernity centers on the themes
of “catch-up” and “assimilation” as a progressive agenda, yet it is also marked by cultural essentialism as “an antimodern theory of modernization” that seeks an alternative brand of modernity (Wang 1998). This new founded social imagination is translated into the nation’s new identity that directs a people’s imagination about who they are, where they are now, and what they should collectively aspire to be (ibid.). The state of modernity in China is based off of imageries and imaginations in relation to the West, that conceiving modernity in China is almost impossible to be detached from the West, regardless of the ideological posture in total rejection or idolization of the West. Western-centric modernity is an integral part of the descriptive language of modernity in China.

Despite its persistent condescension to China, Western-centric modernity has its origins in Chinese traditional political structure and socioeconomic practices that inspired Enlightenment and the leading Western thinkers. This sets China a unique position in the discourse of modernity. The Chinese traditional model had a bearing on the constituent elements of modernity – Enlightened despotism, the concept of civil services, and laissez-faire, all of which drove European modernization (Golden 2006). This historical context of Western-based modernity reverses the familiar narrative of the modern, in which the Western sense of modern and its universalism owe an intellectual debt to China.

The Jesuit China Missions during the 17th Century brought Europe a wealth of information in Chinese political system and socio-cultural landscapes. Jesuit documentation of Qing Kangxi Emperor inspired Montesquieu’s idea of Enlightened Despotism (ibid.). Voltaire was inspired by the Chinese political system and the imperial examinations, which were designed to select elites based on their own merits demonstrated through public examinations, to invent the modern concept of civil services (ibid.). Physiocracy leader François Quesnay proposed reorganization of French economy on an agricultural basis with minimal government intervention to model on China’s sedentary subsistence agriculture, giving rise to the Physiocratic concept of laissez-faire.

This dichotomous ideological posture led to an oscillating path to modernization swinging between total rejection and total espousal of Western praxis. The polarized perspective had a history back to the Self-strengthening Movement in response to the military defeat at the Opium Wars. Imperial defenders of the Confucian traditional employed the Neo-Confucian distinction between substance (ti, 體) and function (yong, 用) to formulate a conservative policy of instrumental westernization: “Chinese learning as the substance, foreign learning as the function” (zhong xue wei ti, yang xue wei yong, 中學為體，西學為用) (Wakeman 2002). The advocates believed that Chinese nativist essence could be preserved by Western technology to contain the colonial influence, which defined a contemporary social imagery and aspirations shared among a narrow bureaucratic circle.

The futility of instrumental westernization soon appeared to the Manchu conservatives of 1867 and later to the Reform Generation of 1898 (ibid.). Pursuing Western technology means learning Western knowledge, which entailed the change in the traditional curriculum of the imperial examination system that tested Confucian classics. It was impossible to separate the essence of Chinese learning from the new functional instruments borrowed to preserve it. The abolition of the traditional examination system in 1905 served the ideological connections between central state authority and local elites, driving the provincial reform and 1911 Xinhai political revolution. From this political revolution to the cultural revolution of 1919 May Fourth Movement, China’s salvation seemed to young urban intellectuals to depend upon a total rejection of Chinese tradition and espousal of a new enlightenment project to embrace Western democracy and scientific universalism (ibid.).

During the heyday of the May Fourth Movement, Eurocentric universalism was widely celebrated and formulated a collective aspiration to break away from the Confucian feudal past. To quote Lee Oufan on the new historical consciousness:

“In the popular May Fourth parlance, to be ‘modern’ means above all to be ‘new’ (xin, 新), to be consciously opposed to the ‘old’ (jiu, 舊)...This intellectual posture of newness does not by itself represent anything new, for in traditional China there were indeed recurrent debates between ‘new’ and ‘old’...What makes for the qualitative difference in the May Fourth formulation is rather its implicit equation of newness with a new temporal continuum form the present to the future...In other words, the notion and value of ‘newness’ are defined in a context of unilinear time and a unilinear sense of history that is characteristically untraditional and Western” (1991).

It was this characteristic of the May Fourth Movement to be considered as the advent of broad-based modernity in China. This historical consciousness marked
the dawn of modern Chinese political thought with an ideograph of “progress” and “new trends of thoughts”. The political innovation and reinvention of social reality were projected as possible and requisite pursuits for the enlightening Chinese society (Haapanen 2011). Numerous articles in the May Fourth Movement journals discussed the prevailing trends of the time and the necessity to adapt to these trends. Journals such as New Youth (Xin Qingnian, 新青年), New Tide (Xin Chao, 新潮), Weekly Critic (Meizhou Pinglun, 每週評論), Young China (Shao-nian Zhongguo, 少年中國), and The Citizen (Guo Min, 國民) were full of articles that discussed “the beginning of a new era” (ibid.). Different authors emphasized different ideas, but “the new tide of thought” was commonly connected to Western Enlightened ideologies like democracy, Marxism, socialism, and mutual aid (ibid.). The paradigm of modern for China was founded on a novelty set on Western ideas and the dismissal of traditions to reconceive China as an enlightened modern society.

Notwithstanding the growing enlightened urban intellectual population, modernization endeavors were frustrated by the persistence of Chinese traditional culture and social life. In Mao Zedong’s words, “China’s 600 million people…are poor and blank” (1958). The political upheavals after the 1911 Revolution prevented the intellectual progress from reaching the mass. The Revolution failed to eliminate the dynastic foundations and left China without a unified central state. The lingering influence of dynastic cycles resulted in history repeating itself with separatist warlord regimes and Nationalist reactionaries seeking material support from foreign powers. China’s internal power struggles and political divisions between Nationalist and Communist Parties continued its semi-colonial status until the Japanese military occupation turned the country into a fully colonial position during the War of Resistance. In the face of imperialism, China was politically united for a short period of time to contain Japanese aggression.

After the end of Second Sino-Japanese War, modernity in China began to depart from the Western path to modernity. In Frederic Wakeman’s interpretation of Mao Zedong’s historical formulation of modernity,

“The struggle continued against unalloyed capitalist and their political arm…to carry out a social revolution under the Communist Party and the people’s democratic dictatorship to make the great leap forward into socialism…Chinese modernity was fully to be achieved by Leninist means, that is, by political leadership rather than through independent social development” (2002).

The Western sense of the modern was appropriated by Chinese Marxists to make a virtue of China’s backwardness and redefine modernity. Communism instituted by Chinese Communist Party under Mao became “the means of attaining ultimate modernity in both a specifically Chinese and universally Marxist manner…constituted the intellectual grounds for the Maoist Sinification of Marxism-Leninism” (ibid.). Mao inscribed a voluntaristic vision of modernity in the early 1950s that China could leap over the capitalist state and move directly into socialism with part-designed programs of social revolution to overtake Soviet Union’s revisionist modernity, and to attain new dignity by serving as the leader of the proletarian nations (ibid.). Mao’s reinvention of modernity created another ideograph for the mass to believe in the regime’s capacity in outpacing the West. This revolutionary imagination eventually failed in the debacle of Cultural Revolution.

Deng Xiaoping’s decision to introduce market economy and selective westernization to China reverted its state of modern to the Western capitalist notion. In the 1980s, the Western modernist thought dominated the Chinese intellectual sphere that evoked the May Fourth Enlightenment project of remaking Chinese citizenry by iconoclasm (Tao 1999). Chinese traditions were once again perceived as the obstacle of modernization. The intrusion of Western universalism aroused Chinese consciousness to find a cultural and political self, where Deng’s proposition of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” became appealing. The renewed the ti-yong (substance-function) dichotomy legitimated Chinese cultural essentialism and reduced modernity to acultural function and global universalism. Socialism and political stability figure center in the culture to be preserved as an expression of China’s self-alienation. Socialism and regime stability were understood as cultural essence, political commitment, and nativist particularism. Frederic Wakeman defines the characteristics of this version of modernity: the absence of a civil society, a weak public sphere, and a strong state and society bounded in “Chip-on-the-shoulder nationalism” (Wakeman 2002).

POSTMODERNISM IN CHINA, CHINESE POSTMODERNISM
China’s modernization experiment created fundamental tensions between social transformation and economic growth. In the 1990s, “post-studies” (houxue, 後
Postmodernism, hence, carries a revolutionary orientation to seek an alternative narrative of modernity. It has provided a new ideological environment for living with the dilemma of Chinese socialist modernity that points to the idea of postmodern to a horizon beyond socialism. It implies a connection between postmodernism and postsocialism to evoke a new articulation of Chinese traditions and values. The believed newness creates a political excitement that strengthens the self-assertion of Chineseness to turn Chinese postmodernity into an integral part of the expression of the changing socioeconomic and sociopolitical landscapes.

The desire of liberation from the past manifests the problematic of Chinese postmodernity in its formulation of newness. For any new ideas can only be experienced against the established long-standing norms, Chinese postmodernity’s newness is no exception. To claim Chinese postmodernity as a window of opportunities to transcend modernity highlights its internal precariousness and contradiction. The timeless, ahistorical new is fundamentally hinged upon a particular historical reference and symbols that it tries to defy and/or transcend. Chinese postmodernity’s pursuit is constrained by the past that inscribes a particular cultural-political subjectivity to prefigure the newness. Where Chinese postmodernity tries to confront modernity (as the West) and the entrenched Chinese historical traditions (as premodern subjects), they don’t disappear into such critical pursuit, but instead become intertwined with it (Zhang 2008).

Chinese postmodernity operates on a constant ideological agitation between different epistemologies that feed into its instability and paradox. The demystification of the West profoundly changes the Chinese identity politics. Western-centric modernity is no longer the mandate of a legitimate modern state. The postmodern excitement to embrace an authentic Chinese identity fuels the postmodern debate with a heightened sense of ideological self-righteousness. Neoconservatism is one of the interrogations of Chinese postmodernism (ibid.). This line of criticism characterizes Chinese postmodernism with a backward tendency in that the idea borrows the Western discourse of “post-studies” to maintain the status quo, i.e., the reluctance to discard the Socialist modern system and cultural legacies. Neoconservative critics see the borrowed Western ideas as a negation of the forward motion of Chinese social ideal, a manifestation of the lingering premodern and Western influence. A parallel accusation of Chinese
postmodernism is the impulse of internal periodization for Chinese modernity and postmodernity. It sets a rigid historical categorization to reject the postmodern state of China, where the Chinese civil society is still immature; therefore, China is not modern yet. The implied urge for returning to universal normality, i.e., the Western-centric modern, exposes Chinese postmodernism to inherit the historical tensions of modernity (ibid.). While Chinese postmodernism aspires to reach the Chinese authentic, autonomous modernity, it is ultimately bounded by the inevitable tendency towards “Postmodernism in China” that orients China towards the global culture. Chinese postmodernism thus designates an ambiguous space of Chinese society in the recurring metanarrative of modernity, where the political, cultural, and historical contradictions signify a sociocultural paradigm corresponding and affirming this ambiguous reality, but not transcending the believed universal truth with a limitless novelty.

NORMALIZATION IN THE WESTERN GAZE: WENMING IN SPIRITUAL CIVILIZATION
One of the curious phenomena arises with Chinese postmodernism is the preoccupation with wenming in political and civic propaganda since the 1990s. Although Deng articulated the need for building spiritual civilization to combat the “spiritual pollution” associated with modernization in the 1980s, his spiritual civilization framework, namely the Four Basic Principles, had limited efficacy in remaking Chinese national character. The complex is a mere political posture and compromise to pledge adherence to socialism and the Chinese Communist Party autocracy. The actual work of building spiritual civilization started in the 1990s. The Chinese government led by Jiang Zemin began to publish moral aphorisms of normative behavioral instructions with repeated use of wenming to project a moral and social ideal in civilizing people’s minds.

The swift implementation of economic and structural reforms creates socio-economic inequalities and a class of urban poor. This consequence exacerbates the lingering premodern elements in Chinese society – poverty, ignorance, chaos, and repression, which entails control mechanisms to guarantee the stability of society and economy. Civilizing of mind, i.e., spiritual civilization, has become an essential project and efficient tool for social control, as the ideological and disciplining counterpart of “material civilization”, which took form in an unbalanced and unjust growth (Boutonnet 2011). Some spiritual civilization tenets were displayed in the “Charters of Civilization” (Wenming Gongyue, 文明公約) in large Chinese cities, promoting the universal attributes of a civil society such as social harmony, collectivism, law-abiding, environmental consciousness, etc. to enhance the overall civic quality (gongming suzhi, 公民素質) of Chinese population. This is to remind Chinese people of the moral standards that they should comply with, to facilitate the operation of the social order under a market economy. This implies an ongoing civilization process of the Chinese population, a process of adaptation to the new conditions of China.

The wenming fixation of spiritual civilization embodies the ideological dilemma of Chinese postmodernism. Spiritual civilization envisages a reorientation of the Chinese society to a new form of prosperity free from premodern signs and social ills produced by Western-centric modernity. The civilization project hence considerably corresponds to Chinese postmodern desire to transcend and disassociate with the past and the West, to prove the possibility of having a self-autonomous civilization with promising future for the Chinese population. Yet the normative symbols and rationalities employed in the wenming discourse once again reveal the inevitable tendency towards “Postmodernism in China,” hence the inescapable Western-centric power hierarchy. These endeavors inscribe a normalization process of Western social codes and urban culture, which have become undisputable universal values, to set China on the assimilation to global in the Western gaze.

The normalization implication is found in the semantics of civilization, the literal English translation of wenming. Hence wenming inherits civilization’s complex connections and connotations with social and political standards and urbanity in related terms such as civilized, citizen, civilian, civic, civil, and civility (ibid.). Considering the meaning of the derived terms therefore inform the semantics of wenming. To name a few, “citizen” refers to a member of community entitled to participate through his or her rights and duties; “civility” has definitions of politeness and individual acts conform to social conventions of prosperity; “civilized” is a positive description of polite and educated individuals. Civilization, including wenming, can be interpreted as the process of bringing individuals to civility and politeness, as well as an advanced stage in human social development.

This interpretation leads to a more productive meaning and process. Civilization inscribes urban standards of life in opposition to rural, where social, po-
itical and cultural structures of dominations centralized in cities (ibid.). In the similar vein, civilization is used as a synonym for modernity or progress when the West claimed to bring civilization to “primitive” and “uncivilized” indigenous population through colonization. These inferences reflect the binary opposition between something supposedly backward or minor and something supposedly advanced. Civilization, then, ultimately means a modeling process to control and dominate through the claim to advance a community and/or society to the presupposed superior stage. This corresponds to the theory of civilizing process in which civilization is a process that needs to be promoted (Elias 2000). Civilization is therefore a standardization and normalization of behaviors and attitudes to comply with the social conventions and moral standards practiced by the upper class and urban elite. The process of civilizing is fundamentally an expression of domination upon “the other” by a reconfiguration of one’s practices, that “the desire not to conquer the Other, but to be desired by the Other” (Duara 2001). The process of standardization should be seen as a social control instrument operating in the disguise of “civilizing mission”.

A more productive outcome of this discursive superiority discourse is a self-controlled, hierarchical homogenization mechanism. The presupposed superiority implies “a whole set of grades of normality, which are signs of belonging to a homogenous social body, but which involve a function of classification, of hierarchical organization” (Foucault 1995). This is reinforced by the development of a self-control system whereby individuals unconsciously impose social codes to themselves. When this grade of normality is defined by modern nation states, it entails a social control mechanism to serve the expanded social standardization, which an entire population is expected to comply with to avoid marginalization (Boutonnet 2011). The civilizing process hence exhibits a centripetal normalizing force capable of bringing the marginalized back to the sphere of influence. With the standardizing nature, civilization aims at creating homogenized space and population that instills the normalized political concepts and ideologies to perpetuate the entire mechanism (ibid.).

It is in this semantic context of “civilization” that the wenming rhetoric be seen as a normalization process of social practices and morality of the Chinese population. The Western gaze, however, has to be further explored in the meaning of wenming in order to make sense of the futility of Chinese postmodernism and spiritual civilization. The regular definitions of wenming refer to culture, and an advanced stage of development and cultural achievement (ibid.), but these definitions offer limited insights. Even the etymology of wenming itself, constituted by wen 文, meaning writing, language, and objects of literary; and ming 明, meaning brightness, clarity and obviousness, provides limited information. In classical Chinese language, wen and ming are seldom used together. If they are used together, it only has a connotation of clear-sightedness and talent, which does not have any association with the West. It was until the 1860s when the Japanese thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi borrowed the term as a translation for the English word civilization, inspired by François Guizot’s 1828 General History of Civilization in Europe, then wenming began to be associated westernization and modernization (Berme and Goldkorn 2013). Wenming as a reinvented term was imported back to China at the end of 1890s, and used to refer to someone civilized and enlightened in association with the West and modernity. This is when wenming began to share the sematics of civilization, and to become synonymous with righteous, appropriate, and high standards. Although the ideological content of wenming has changed throughout the years, its relation with civilization and the inherited power hierarchy with the West persisted. The preoccupation with wenming in spiritual civilization therefore shows a self-controlled standardization mechanism taking on a national scale to engineer homogenized social practices defined by the West, i.e., in the Western gaze. Regardless of the orientation of China’s social practices and notions of morality, the Western gaze works as the centripetal normalizing force to subjugate this system. The historical determinism that limits Chinese postmodernism and spiritual civilization is self-revealing in the semantics of wenming and civilization.

**WENMING SHANGHAI: WORLD EXPO AND NATIONAL CIVILIZED CITY**
The institutional endeavor of building spiritual civilization is best exemplified in the Model City Programs (mofan chengshi, 模範城市). The Model Program has a political history of Maoist-style campaigns to provide idealized visions of development, officially approved standards for urban modernization through propaganda apparatus. Although the Program’s approach has changed from mass mobilization to social control regulations and urban governance, its ultimate objective of promoting an urban ideal remains. Examples include National Environmental Protection Model Cities (guojia huanjing baohu mofan chengshi, 國家環境保護模範城市), National Ecological Garden City (guojia shengtai yuanlin chengshi
The National Civilized City Campaign is a top-down, commercialized form of Maoist mobilization in present-day China (ibid.). It features propaganda slogans in large colorful Chinese characters printed on all kinds of billboards and signs. This commercialized form of Maoist practice is a central and highly visible feature in contemporary Chinese urban environment. These slogans have a key expression of wenming to construct the idea of about individual roles in building modern cities, which evoke a notion that the future of China lies in the city as a paragon of national modernization and development.

National Civilized City is the highest state honorary title granted by the Central Steering Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization (Zhongyang Jingshen Wenming Jianshe Zhidao Weiyuanhui, 中央精神文明建設指導委員會). The Commission awards the title to urban governments in recognition of achieving party-designated standards in urban civilization and social harmony (shehui hexie, 社會和諧), which includes categories of education of party officials, promotion of the rule of law, public security, development of the consumer environment, provision of new cultural facilities, volunteer social services organization and environmental quality (Zhao 2008).

To be awarded the title, a city must voluntarily apply for evaluation and demonstrate a clean government. To qualify, jurisdictions must attain the status of being designated an Advanced Civilized City (xianjin wenming chengshi, 先進文明城市), based on a set of statistical indicators, in order to prepare for site evaluation. Local Spiritual Civilization Offices coordinate with other branches of government to plan and implement activities that will meet their goals in nine categories, based on over 100 indicators. Subsequent to preliminary assessment, cities are subject to local site inspection including interviews with local citizens. Each of the eleven categories of standards is subject to multiple criteria of evaluation and assessment, based on the Civilized City Evaluation Work Manual, which contains over one hundred separate items and various standards of qualitative or quantitative assessment.

With China’s dedication to construct a model city and showcase Chinese urbanism, Shanghai is unsurprisingly the core of this project. Shanghai is among the first batch of cities that won the title in 2005. To maintain the title through the 2008 evaluation, and prepare for 2010 World Expo themed “Better City, Better Life,” Shanghai wanted to be a model city, and to show how the city of the future should be shaped. In 2006, Shanghai launched a campaign called “Civilized behaviors for Shanghai to welcome the World Expo – Seven Goals” (Shanghai huan shibo wenming xingdong jihua – qijian mubiao, 上海迎世博文明行動計劃 - 七建目標). Shanghainese were asked to “build a city ruled by law, politeness, trust and friendship, a healthy and educated city and where the environment is protected” (Boutonnet 2011). Urban governance was oriented towards an image of a civilized and globalized China capable of interaction with the world with high international and globalized standards. Wenming in Shanghai was given a role to shape a comprehensive structure for a moral order to abide by, so that Chinese society can harmoniously operate, both internal and external.

The Shanghai Spiritual Civilization Offices began to issue signboards with wenming aphorisms such as “do not spit on the ground,” “do not swear,” “do not cross the street without caution” in public space. Besides these “universal” behaviors codes pertaining to the idea of civilization, the signboards also include “speak mandarin”, which gives an additional dimension to wenming. In Shanghai, the common language is Shanghainese spoken by about 80 million people. While mandarin Chinese is officially used throughout China as the national language, many regions still use local languages, which are officially considered as dialects. The instruction of “speak mandarin” evokes a connotation of speaking Shanghainese is uncivilized. In 2009 as the World Expo was approaching, the city government launched a campaign called “Welcoming World Expo” to promote individual behaviors corresponding to international etiquette. Among the reiterated wenming aphorisms, a specific instruction of “do not wear pajamas in public” is problematic. Wearing pajamas in public has been a feature of Shanghai everyday culture. This old way of life became uncivilized as an enemy of Chinese modern civility.
The treatment of Shanghai’s customs and language reflects a state sociopolitical interest to inscribe a particular logic, i.e., (post)modernity and wenming, on a space to serve a national project. Shanghai World Expo presented an opportunity for the continued invention of homogenous linguistic and cultural space as a legitimate modern state. Like civilization, wenming levels out cultural and social diversity to comply with a norm defined by civilizers, i.e., the “universalized” culture. It instills a “proper” commitment to society, while conditioning the minds and social practices in a way that is favorable to the existing modalities. It once again proves the futility of Chinese postmodernism’s ahistorical pursuits, and points to the likely prevalence of global discourse of postmodernism as a lens to understand Chinese cities.

CONCLUSION

The development trajectory of China and Shanghai represents an inscription of a discourse of (post)modernity on space. Each of these endeavors consciously and unconsciously manipulated the definitions of the past and future to produce imaginary and symbolic elements of a specific ideological telos to serve the developments of the time. In the context of “post-studies”, the rise of Chinese postmodernism brought about political excitement for China to acquire autonomy in the modernity discourse. The preoccupation of wenming, however, proves this autonomy to be overridden by Chinese postmodern urbanism’s inevitable tendency towards the globalized vision of postmodernism. It reaffirms the dominant sociopolitical forces behind the articulated urban ideal, which seeks homogenization of differences and peculiarities within a space – Shanghai, and eventually China. Yet it does not mean a truly autonomous urban vision is unthinkable, where Henri Lefebvre proposes changes and (re)appropriation of space that will destabilize the underlying logic consistency (Lefebvre 1991). For Chinese postmodern urbanism to reinvent itself, destabilization of the prevailing spatial logic is a requisite step.

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PIETRO CALOGERO is a lecturer at San Francisco State University and the University of California, Berkeley, where he completed his Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning in 2011. His work has focused largely on housing both in Kabul and here in San Francisco, with the research for his dissertation done while teaching at Kabul University in 2007.

In November of 2014 I had the opportunity to sit down with Professor Calogero and talk about his experience in Kabul. During the summer of 2014 I was a junior in Professor Calogero’s Cities in a Global Society class. He spoke of his time working in Kabul for the Ministry of Urban Housing and Development, teaching at Kabul University and Kabul Polytechnic University, and the joy of riding a one-speed bicycle down a flat road in the dusty streets of Kabul; an experience not many would expect to hear, given the state of Kabul portrayed to Americans in the early 2000s.

My imagination was captured by Professor Calogero’s stories of planning in Kabul. I wanted to know more. I wanted to know about the people of Kabul – what are their lives like? The government – what were its land use policies? The land – what was it like at night? I feel very fortunate to have had the opportunity to listen to hear some
of his story. I do not think it is any stretch to say that Professor Pietro Calogero is a favorite amongst the Urban Studies and Planning students at San Francisco State University. He possesses a wonderful ability to connect many different ideas in the process of explaining where we are in today’s world with regard to planning and geopolitics. Not only can he connect these ideas seamlessly, he is able to present these concepts with an ease and elegance that is not often found either academically or professionally.

I’m very happy to say that as of April 2015, Professor Calogero was invited back to teach at Kabul University. The program is funded by USAID however and due to the current travel ban by the State Department, U.S. citizens cannot travel to Afghanistan funded by USAID. The outcome of his return to Kabul remains unknown, though Professor Calogero is hopeful the matter can be resolved.

R: Shannon Roberts
C: Pietro Calogero

R: You’re a teacher, a planner, and an architect – how did you discover planning?
C: How did I discover planning? I think actually through travel. When my dad finished the army and we moved to San Francisco for him to finish up medical school it was a big contrast between North Carolina where I was born and Winston Salem where I spent my pre-school years and then being in San Francisco – it was very, very different than East and Central North Carolina – so actually I have a drawing that I did when I was seven about planning cities and liking them to be sort of gridded, orderly, and compact. San Francisco seemed so much more interesting to me. Planning per se – I thought about it when I did my undergrad in Geography – I didn’t sort it out quickly enough so I did the architecture degree.

R: So you actively sought out geography instead because that was similar to where your interest lay?
C: Yeah, when I was a teenager I was much more interested in mountaineering and backpacking so when I got to Berkeley and went through the course catalog – which was huge, like a phone book – I just picked out the courses I wanted to do. I wasn’t sure I was going to stay in school, I wasn’t sure I was going to stick with getting a Bachelor’s, so I just picked a bunch of advanced Geography courses and four years later I had to substitute those out for the intro courses I never took. I was willing to get crappy grades and push myself really hard and I was fine. It all worked out.

R: You completed your Ph.D. in Urban and Regional Planning at Berkeley in 2011 and your dissertation and fieldwork was done in Kabul, Afghanistan. What drew you to planning abroad? Travel? Had you been over there before?
C: I first went to Kabul in May of 2003. I guess for international planning, a lot of it actually started before I studied planning or architecture, because I was studying Geography – part of what you do is study other countries and their internal politics and spatial formation and a lot of what I looked at was urban geography, so a lot of the theoretical basis. I was interested in Central Asia but partially because it was hard to get any information on it in the 1980s, and so at the same time I was trying to find out information on Central Asia, refugees from Afghanistan were coming into the East Bay. The Soviet occupation was getting kind of ugly, they were tightening the screws on people in ’86, ’87 so a lot of refugees fled to the Bay Area right around that time when I was trying to get any information on the region.

I started getting to know some Afghan-Americans around ’87, 1988 maybe; and so I had known them well over a decade by the time it became actually possible to go to Afghanistan. I’ve known a few Americans who have gotten into parts of the country during the 90s, but they have serious thrill issues. I mean it was really, really dangerous getting into Afghanistan in the 90s. But I just stayed in touch and through basically citizen organizations in the East Bay – Fremont and Hayward and Union City – and through fundraisers of Afghan-Americans themselves, I managed to be able to get over to Kabul. My first time there was the 28th of May, 2003. On that day I essentially went from the airport to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing and the Minister put me to work. I worked for the Islamic Republic from sort of my first day in Afghanistan.

R: So I was going to say - that sort of answers my next question – I was going to say you taught at both Kabul University and Kabul Polytechnic University – and you were also working for the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing in Kabul. How did that transition happen? You started working for the Ministry first? And then you started teaching, or was it kind of at the same time?
C: No it was not at the same time, it happened sequentially. So I worked for the Ministry for a month – and that’s all I could afford, ‘cause the lost wages of preparing for it cost me thousands of dollars to just take the time to set up
everything necessary to go. There was no ethical way to ask for pay from the Afghan Government. Although once I arrived there, I found that actually there were quite a few western consultants that were being paid extraordinary sums of money [laughs], some more than $20,000 a month to work as consultants in Afghanistan.

R: When you say consultants, do you mean planning consultants?

C: In a broader definition of planning yes, not specifically urban planning – no. There was one woman doing planning consulting for the city government, the municipality - Pushka Pakta – she’s from Delhi, she wasn’t being paid that, she was being paid maybe a quarter of that. But going over there I thought that was unethical to begin with and then I realized actually that the cost of going over there is very high for anyone who is a westerner and you know, in a larger structural sense the extreme split between rich and poor has increased between countries over time. So the monthly costs for me of maintain an apartment over here, health insurance you know, I had already married and had two kids by that point and my fundamental bare bones operating costs for just sustaining here in the Bay Area were quite high – well over $3,500 a month on absolute bare minimum. That is ten times the annual per capita income of an Afghan. Ten times the annual per capita income of an Afghan. So, we were more than a 100 times the monthly.

There is a huge ethical problem if you go to a place as poor as Kabul at the time or Afghanistan more generally, then an ethical question is “what can you do to justify the difference in pay that you’re going to get than somebody locally?” If you’re being paid – and you know people weren’t paid the bare minimum for keeping their apartment and health insurance. Here they were being paid $120,000 to $250,000 a year. So that's hugely problematically I think, so there’s that side which I think just has to be there out on the table. That's a problem.

I went initially as a volunteer in mid-2003 and in fall 2003 I signed on with a beltway consultancy – one of these planning consultancies from D.C. They’re sometimes known as beltway bandits [laughs], and they probably should be, and they sent me over as their fixer. Which is kind of a compliment I guess, since I’d only been there for five weeks. Normally a fixer is a local guy who deals with getting the mobile phones, getting the housing, getting the transportation setup, getting the logistics setup. So it was a compliment that they [laughs] sent me as their fixer to find the local fixer amongst the Afghan’s that we would work with.

But it didn’t work out because they were trying for a no-bid contract from the World Bank and the World Bank didn’t want to do that. So that project fell through, so I pursued a bunch of ways to get funding to get over there. Because I could see how much it would cost just to be over there for five weeks and five weeks – there is damn little you can do.

R: You mentioned you have a wife and two kids; did they go with over there or was it just, that you were trying to support over there?

C: I went alone but the cost was actually that they were here. We lived in a shotgun apartment on Natoma Street off of Sixth in what’s known as “wine country” in San Francisco. It’s essentially it’s an extension of the Tenderloin. But they were here and my son was born March of 2003, so he was four months old when I first went. He was too young for even getting the immunizations, by that fall it became clear he had asthma when he had a cold and the air quality in Kabul was so bad I wouldn’t risk his life. Because if he had a serious asthmatic attack in Kabul we wouldn’t be able to get him out alive.

That's sort of in extreme contrast with my wife who was born in Tehran. And when she found out I would be going to a Farsi speaking country first she cried, because she was just so jealous, she wanted to go really, really badly. She taught me as much Farsi as she could before I went. So within our family we were very pro-going but my kids were – my son partially was not healthy enough at the time. And it’s harder to evaluate risk for four people vs. a single person.

As it happens I look like Afghans because I’m Italian-American – that’s what they told me – and I showed up in Kabul and I was like, “yep, sure do!” but the rest of my family doesn’t. My wife could pass as Armenian but that’s it. My kid, you know, he’s got blonde hair from both sides of the family – he looks Swedish from my side and English from his Mom’s side and he doesn’t look like any Afghan [laughs]. Especially when he was young, very blonde hair. So looked very different. My daughter looks like my Grandma from Naples. But that said, in 2007 when I was doing my fieldwork, my wife came to visit me. She loves Kabul, she thinks it’s a beautiful city. The kids were still young so we had to take care of them.

R: How would you describe the city? What are the streets like? What are the buildings like?
C: The first thing is the landscape it’s in. It’s at the base of the Hindukush, so it’s in these two intermountain bases and they’re really dramatic. Kind of like the Bay Area. People first see it and they’re like, “well the skyscrapers are not particularly stand out”. If you compare them to LA or Seattle or certainly Chicago’s high-rises, what we have here is not particularly distinctive. Our Victorian houses are kind of nice – but there isn’t very much distinctive architecture in the Bay Area at all. It’s the landscape though, the weather, the climate. So Kabul is kind of like that – it’s in a base range area like Novato. Very, very flat bottomed mountain bases, where most of the city is [situated] is as flat as a pancake. You can ride around on a one-speed bike which I did. It was great, it was fun.

The mountains that broaden the city and then the range that goes right through the city are like sharks’ teeth. They’re just incredibly steep, jagged mountains. It’s so dramatic, it’s very beautiful. A lot of squatters live up on those mountains. One of those jokes among Afghans is that some foreigner visits the city and they first arrive at night and the foreigner says, “Wow! We had no idea you had such a high-rise skyline”. And the joke is that no, actually, it’s very poor people living in shacks way up on the mountains. In reality, a desert at night – particularly when the moon is out – it’s very clear, so you can see the lights going up the hill, but you can also see silhouette of those mountains; black against black. It’s gorgeous.

R: In a lecture earlier this year, you mentioned there is a perception among westerners that the Afghan government is not aware of all the settlements or where people are and you said actually said, no, they are. They are aware of every squatter settlement and how many people are in that settlement. Can you elaborate on that?

C: Yes I will, but I need to completely answer a question I realized I didn’t answer previously. So I initially worked for the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing which is now called the Ministry of Urban Affairs. They’ve renamed it – new minister. But what I tried to do was figure out a source of funding for getting there for the longer term. That’s how I ended up in the Ph.D. program. I went back and reported to the teachers who had taught me about informal housing and planning in the third world as it used to be called in the 20th century and one of my teacher’s said, “You’ve got to apply for a Ph.D., that’s ridiculous. Come on.” so I did as a way to get access to funding. So that’s why I ended up doing the Ph.D.

In terms of getting funding, the irony is that actually American funding sources were terrified of giving money to somebody doing research in Afghanistan. Which is food for thought, I think that’s a really, really important issue and a very disturbing one. That the State Department said it’s a no go zone for citizens, therefore the Department of Education followed their cue, so there was no dissertation funding available. Which meant at the high-end, the Fulbright, which I don’t know if I could get – it’s very competitive, but I was not eligible to even compete. I couldn’t even apply. Less prestigious funding as well, like NSF funding is great, but it’s not sort of the highbrow thing the Fulbright is, so not as many people apply. I might have been able to get NSF funding but – the National Science Foundation? No, again it’s a part of the Federal Government. The private foundations followed suit, so Rockefeller, Ford, MacArthur, and less known dissertation funding – it just wasn’t available.

Eventually I actually got hired by the World Bank. They’ve got a bunch of branches, one is their IBRD – International Bank of Reconstruction and Development that builds dams. But it was what they call their “knowledge arm” – The World Bank Institute said, you know we would love to have somebody teaching Afghans about planning policy, kind of in a more legible context. One where you might better prepare them for writing grants to us, so they can actually write grant applications saying “we want to do xyz program” so go to universities and teach that. And I said “done!”

I already had actually affiliated with Kabul University on the advice of some researchers in Kabul and they said, “well congratulations then, you’ve just fulfilled the terms of a bid we’ve had sitting out there for three years and nobody else qualified for it...we’ll pay you. Go teach at Kabul University,” and I did. So that’s how I ended up teaching later on and it was that longer term chunk that mattered to be because I could actually spend time with Afghans. And have a bit of a meeting of minds. What I was seeing was people saying, “well the Western way is the best way” and I was not convinced. I looked about the city and I thought “this is an interesting city” and its planning should reflect it. I had studied enough planning history in San Francisco and western cities to know that nobody rubber stamped it on us. Americans hashed it out on their own terms, based on their own cities. I wanted to decompile, in computer terms, the source code, and say, “Well actually, land use planning as we do it in the United States may not work at all in Kabul.” Let’s revisit it, why do we do land use
planning the way we do it? Sort of just lay out the parts on the table so Afghans
could look at them and say, “Yeah, we can use this one, once we know what the
hell it means and how to reinterpret it.”

That takes more time and that’s more like not telling Afghans, “Oh, Americans
have a great way to do planning” God knows we’ve produced suburbia [laughs].
Who are we to say our planning is superior? We’re trying to undo our own
damage.

In answer to your question about involvement, I started by working for the Ministry
and then Kabul University, and then I was invited to teach at the Polytechnic,
which is a rare privilege. It was developed by the Soviets and Westerns were
leery of it even as late as 2007 when I taught there.

Your next question was about this problem of Westerners believing that Afghans
can’t govern –

R: Or that the Western form of government and planning is superior.

C: In terms of what we teach here, there is a very specific history to the way that
planning is done here. [Professor] Tony Sparks and I teach much the same thing.
If you look at Supreme Court decisions, you get Goa – which was great because
it affirmed the 14th Amendment and it got this poor Chinese launderer out of
jail here in San Francisco for you know, essentially a bigoted city con trying to
really force Chinese out during the financial panic of the 1870s. Then you got
Plessy v. Ferguson which almost went the other way and officially established
segregation in the United States 1896. Then you get Ambler v. Euclid which
establishes land use planning as we know it. Which is segregated land use. It
is using the same principle of segregation to avoid conflict. What David Harvey
calls ‘the spatial fix’.

Later you get Brown v. Board in 1954 which starts to desegregate school but
in many ways America remains a segregated country and our land use was
unapologetic about it – and we tend not to make that linkage, but frankly it’s still
segregationist policy. So to say that American policy, that our planning practices
are the model for the world? Bad idea, bad idea. We really do need to look beyond say
the quarterly return that is looked at in business, the sort of closed-end positivist
approach of political science, we actually have to capture the full thing, which
is citizens trying to live better lives, seeking justice. These are difficult things
to define in quantifiable terms, but that’s just what people are after. They want
better lives. How do we do that? What are the measures? What do people teach
us about that?

Then we get into places where we can do policy development, which has as
much to do with listening to people as it does telling them what is the right way
to go.

R: So playing off of that, you mention that you actually ended up working for the
World Bank and that’s how you were able to fund going to Kabul and they really
wanted you to teach Afghans how to write grant applications. To an extent could
that be an attempt to slightly Westernize the society over there?

C: Yes, yes. Westernize or modernize in a particular ideology, yeah. There are
aspects of that I didn’t agree with, and actually the people who hired me didn’t
agree with either, but said well, “this is the way we actually frame things, so that’s
what the contract is going to say on it. Good luck, go have a good time, do
what you’re going to do,” and in practice what they gave me was tremendous
freedom to do what the hell I wanted to. Just to give you a sense of how extreme
it was, I said, “look, my first time here working for the Islamic Republic, I found
I can take care of my own safety issues”, which is why they sent me. They were
like, “Pietro, whatever, you send him off [and] we’ll find him. He’s out there
somewhere, doing fine, functioning in a place where everybody else says ‘oh my
Area, where are you going to look? Antioch, Vallejo, some edge suburb – what
used to be the destination of White Flight and what is now actually a very color
diverse place and might be bankrupt or very close to it, and that’s where houses
are affordable. That’s suburbia now.

If you’re a well-paid hipster working for a tech firm you’re going to be living in the
Mission at eight times the density if not ten times the density of suburbia.
So that whole myth, the late 20th century idea, it was a mistake and we need to
undo that damage. A lot of our planning policy still pushes the suburban dream.
That part I think – in terms of land use planning, that is kind of disastrous.

When planners get together, when we talk amongst ourselves, when we get away
from land use planning, when we talk about long-term view, looking beyond say
the quarterly return that is looked at in business, the sort of closed-end positivist
approach of political science, we actually have to capture the full thing, which
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like, “Pietro, whatever, you send him off [and] we’ll find him. He’s out there
somewhere, doing fine, functioning in a place where everybody else says ‘oh my

god it's so dangerous’ but it seems to work for him” [laughing].

That being the case, World Bank employees have this whole security protocol they have to go through when they’re there, they have to be in these armed compounds. I said there is no way I could do my research from there; how could I go out and teach Afghans if I’m locked down like Rapunzel? They knew that they could not hire me directly. So the urban specialist at the time, she looked around for about six months to find some organization that would help: The Aga Khan Trust for Culture, which is led by Aga Khan who is the head of the Ismaili Sect of Shiites. They’ve been doing great, really, really solid work in Kabul for a long time, and they said, “we’ll act as your fiduciary.” The Aga Khan Trust, they’re a really classy global organization. So their payroll guys and the World Bank’s payroll guys apparently met in Geneva to try and figure out how to sync up whatever they needed to do to, to transfer payments through to pay me. I was like their one off, weird project and they were like, “alright, we’re going to set him loose in Kabul and he’s going to buy a Chinese bicycle and manage in the streets for weeks and report in once a week, he seems okay” [laughing].

They really bent over backwards to enable me to do that. Particularly the specialist who set it up. She’s an observant Muslim from Durban, South Africa. She’s a world class, World Bank officer. She worked really hard to give me the room necessary to teach on the terms where I would want to teach. In which case, if some compete grant application does come back to them – essentially what I have achieved; I’m not sure if I’ve done that yet – is to get Afghans to read the sort of frequency, the kind of wavelength on which Westerners are working so that you can design a program that Westerners would understand and one that they might support.

R: So one that’s really closer to a halfway point that both sides can see and understand?

C: Right. So what Westerners are uncomfortable with in Kabul is that half – well now about three-quarters of the city is informal housing. To get back to another question of yours, the local planners there, the local ministers, they know every transaction, they know every sight. And now all of us know because we can use Google Earth. We have free access to satellite images, we can see the informal housing moving up the mountainsides and filling in all the unclaimed spaces around the city. So sure, it’s there.

What Westerners were really nervous about, is that the people moving into the informal housing are already poor. They can’t afford legality as it were, so they’re already vulnerable. The government both at the ministry level, but especially at the local municipal level kept threatening to demolish housing. Essentially if you have people in housing where they are materially already poor, but then the housing they’re in is declared insecure – that increases their poverty.

It was from that research that I redefined poverty for myself. Poverty to me is this condition of elevated risk. If you cannot mitigate the risk, that’s poverty. Momentarily it might mean a lack of money, but it might mean you have a great deal of money at some point. But here – if you’re subject to violence – psychological violence, physical violence, and extreme fluctuations in what kind of resources you have available to you – that’s poverty.

For more information on Professor Calogero’s work, visit www.calogero.us.


This paper will explore the geopolitical history of the region, the birth of the informal La Chureca settlement, and the survival tactics of its residents. Environmental and health impacts of the dumpsite will be discussed in tangent with its provocation of the Acahualinca Project supported by implemented by collaboration between Nicaraguan and Spanish governments.

Once given the title of “one of the Most Horrendous Wonders of the World,” (Maurer 2012) the municipal dump near the capital city of Managua, Nicaragua is currently the center of much activity involving third world international development. The City’s municipal dump is known locally as “La Chureca.” At its peak the dump was home to “nearly 1500 people struggling to eke out a living from the refuse of others” (Lamb, 2008). However recently there have been enormous transformations at La Chureca that are drastically impacting the community. The biggest change is a 45-million dollar international development aid project to help modernize the waste processing at La Chureca, completed in 2013. From this massive project stems the other changes occurring within and around the Churequeros (informal trash picking) community. Despite the fact that these changes seek to improve the lives of many...
poverty-stricken Nicaraguans, they will also drastically change the way that many former churequeros make a living and provide for their families.

POLITICS OF DEPRIVATION IN NICARAGUA

Years of political and social unrest, aided by devastating natural disasters is responsible for the extreme and rampant poverty in the capital of Nicaragua. Many also attribute the large-scale poverty to failed attempts at international development in this third world country by countries like the United States. A large part of the 20th century in Nicaragua is known as the Somoza Era (1936-1979). From 1936 to 1956 Somoza Garcia was in control of Nicaragua. He accumulated much wealth during his time in office “through large investments in land, manufacturing, transport, and real estate, he enriched himself and his close friends” during his early years in power (US L.O.C.).

One of the most significant political moves Somoza made while in power was giving his support to the Allies during World War II. In return for his support, Somoza gained US support in return and Nicaragua became a center for raw industrial materials for the war effort. According to the US Library of Congress, “exports of timber, gold, and cotton soared, however, because more than 90 percent of all exports went to the United States, the growth in trade also increased the country’s economic and political dependence” (US L.O.C.). This “agro-export model” developed further throughout the 1950s and 1960s and “worsened impoverishment and landlessness as large-scale capitalists drove campesinos off their land …the result was massive migration to the cities, chiefly to Managua” (Wall, 1993). As the Somoza regime and its affiliates was amassing wealth for itself in this era, many citizens were struggling to get by. The population density in Nicaragua as a result came to have the “lowest arithmetic population density of any Central American country” but at the same time it also became the most urbanized, resulting in an effect where it was labeled both “empty and overcrowded” (Wall 1993). This migration to the city would play a large part in the future level of poverty in Managua.

After WWII, the Somoza regime went in and out of favor with the United States and opposition began gathering within the country. “Illiteracy, malnourishment, inadequate health services, and lack of proper housing” all became serious issues. The poor living conditions attracted criticism from the Catholic Church when Archbishop Bravo who declared that a “battle against the dictator was a just cause” (Lantigua, 1985). Tensions mounted, setting the stage for what catapulted the country into an even more divisive and extreme state of poverty where revolutionary sentiment began to dominate.

In December of 1972 a disaster struck Managua that is still having repercussions today. A catastrophic 6.2 earthquake shook the foundations of the city, resulting in the destruction of a majority of the city’s infrastructure, leaving “approximately 10,000 dead, some 50,000 families homeless, and destroyed 80 percent of Managua’s commercial buildings” (US. L.O.C.). Looting soon followed in Managua as citizens and officials alike took what they wanted from destroyed shops in the city. During this time, “the president’s ability to take advantage of the people’s suffering proved enormous. By some estimates, his personal wealth soared to US $400 million in 1974” (US L.O.C.). The fact that Somoza was profiting from his country’s poverty became a critical point of contention with Nicaraguans and even the international community, paving the way for revolution.

After the 1972 earthquake, the Somoza regime condemned much of the city’s business district and pushed a suburban model of development” (Hartmann 2012). This led to the affluent people of Managua isolating their selves on the periphery of the city while “the destitute and newly arrived immigrants formed squatter settlements throughout Managua”; including the development of the La Chureca slum (Hartmann 2012). These new areas of extreme poverty and informal settlements that began to spring up in Nicaragua following the quake were “excluded from day-to-day social, political, and economic relations, and are effectively ‘zones of exclusion’” (Rodgers, 2005).

The creation of these polarized poor and rich zones in Nicaragua came at the cusp of revolution. The major opposition to the Somoza regime in the 1970s was the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). Two years after the earthquake, the FSLN launched military initiatives to overthrow the Somoza government. What followed was a violent period of guerilla warfare between the Somoza regime and the Sandinista revolutionaries (US. L.O.C.). This led to the eventual takeover of the government by the FSLN in 1979. FSLN ruled until 1990 and FSLN leader Daniel Ortega who is the current president of Nicaragua was voted back into power in 2006. Although Ortega remains in power, the FSLN as
a whole has changed much of the way it governs, moving from the “ideologically rigid and somewhat elitist revolutionary party that it was from 1979 to 1990 to an adaptive socialist party that retains a massive amount of faithful members” (Puig, 2010).

LA CHURECA: A SLUM BIRTHED OUT OF NECESSITY

Urban theorist Mike Davis wrote in Planet of Slums that “the global informal working class...is almost one billion strong: making it the fastest growing, and most unprecedented social class on earth” (Davis, 2004). This informal working class makes up the large majority of residents of La Chureca. This section will look at the urban informality of La Chureca and methods of survival in the face of adversity.

Nicaragua is the second poorest country in Latin America after Haiti. In this country, “two out of three (68 percent) struggle to survive on little more than US $1 per day” (IFAD, 2011). This immense number of impoverished people can be attributed largely to the political and social strife as well as natural disasters that have plagued the country. Hundreds of thousands of people struggle to get by everyday under the new Ortega regime, with many in the Churequero community turning to informal practices to survive outside the watch of the government.

Researcher and Professor of Global and Transnational Studies at the University of Illinois, Asef Bayat put forth an idea of “quiet encroachment” in his journal article From ‘Dangerous Classes’ to ‘Quiet Rebels” that can be applied to the development of informality in La Chureca. Bayat’s idea of “quiet encroachment” refers to a “non-collective but prolonged direct action by individuals and families to acquire basic necessities of their lives in a quiet and unassuming, illegal fashion” (Bayat, 2000). In line with this mode of thought, members of the La Chureca community have been forced to find a way to survive in the face of opposition. The process by which the dump dwellers have been surviving in this environment falls into one of the categories that Bayat discusses in his paper known as “the surviving poor.” Simply stated, “They do not sit around waiting for their fate to determine their lives, rather they are active in their own way to ensure their survival” (Bayat, 2000). He goes on to describe how the surviving poor will resort to illegal methods in order to survive. This often includes the practice of prostitution, which is something that was common in La Chureca. Families would sometimes resort to pimping out their daughters to garbage truck drivers in exchange for money (Rouse 2009). This method of survival is a testament to how dire and hopeless conditions can be for people struggling to survive in this kind of environment.

In his article, Bayat mentions specific informal methods by which the poor find ways to improve their lives. He discusses the way that “quiet encroachment” can mean finding ways to get electricity and water to a shack in a slum. This is something that was very common in the trash picker homes of La Chureca. A thesis with some ethnography fieldwork done in La Chureca during the peak of its existence in 2008 states that “what was interesting about these shanties is that every single home had some sort of electricity to power various items … furthermore, the majority of these shanties contained running water, composed of a makeshift hosing system” (Rouse, 2009). Many inhabitants of the dump were able to make an informal residence in an unforgiving environment more livable through illegal means of attaining utilities like water and electricity.

Bayat’s idea of “quiet encroachment” can be seen in the development of a worker’s union in La Chureca. In 2008 there was a garbage strike that led to the founding of a trash picker’s union. The strike began because the municipal garbage truck drivers were unfairly getting the first pick of good, high-value recyclable waste, leaving the Churequeros the leftover scraps like compost and glass (Hartmann 2012). The trash-pickers revolted by “blocking the entrance to the dump and throwing rocks at collection vehicles that attempted to enter” (Hartmann 2012). Unfortunately the Public Sanitation Department’s only way of resolving the issue was to “[increase] the sanitation engineers’ salary by 40 percent” as incentive for not picking through the garbage due to the fact that this was the Churequeros only form of subsistence (Hartmann 2012). Although this did not have much effect on the income of Churequeros, it did lead to unionization and brought the workers together in a way that they had not united previously. This banding together of the trash-pickers represents a facet of Bayat’s idea of quiet encroachment. When a group's common interest (in this case the reliance on high-value garbage for sustenance) is threatened, the poor “rise up to defend their gains” (Bayat 2000). They did this by forming a union to protect their interests. Unfortunately, the unionization of the churequeros also created more problems, as people who lived outside the dump but came to La Chureca daily
to work in the garbage were often not included in union efforts and therefore could not access benefits of belonging to the union (Hartmann 2012).

ENVIRONMENTAL & HEALTH ISSUES IN LA CHURECA
Unequal access to waste at La Chureca is not the only issue that plagued the people living there. More pressing was the issue of environmental and health risks for the Managua community and even for the larger part of Central America. The following gives an accurate portrayal of the environmental damage that La Chureca was having on its surroundings prior to its eradication:

Lake Managua’s waters are contaminated by leachate from the dump, and seasonal flooding often washes solid waste into the lake…Toxins and waste residue, therefore, seeps unimpeded through the ground and are carried to the lake via water runoff from a nearby watershed. This is problematic because: 1) the contaminated lake threatens Managua’s potable water supply; 2) Lake Managua serves as a place of recreation and source of livelihood (fishing); and 3) during the rainy season, Lake Managua’s water naturally drains into Lake Nicaragua, Central America’s largest freshwater lake, located south of Managua. (Hartmann 2012)

This environmental catastrophe was evident to anyone who set foot in the dump during the worst years of its existence. The residents of la Chureca had to endure exposure to toxic chemicals such as battery fluids and even hospital waste like hypodermic needles and countless other health risks. Furthermore, over 600 of the nearly 1500 people that relied on the dump for their livelihood were children as young as five who worked to help their struggling families (Telemundo 2005). Although all of the churequeros were exposed to extremely dangerous chemicals and toxins, the children specifically were in the most danger, showing very “high levels of lead and mercury” in their bodies as well as high levels of “persistent organochlorine pollutants (POPs)” (Lamb 2008; Caudra 2006). The following is another accurate photograph and description that shows what daily conditions were like for adults and children at La Chureca:

Here, cattle and dogs rummage through the refuse, while hundreds of black-headed vultures search out an easy meal. Spontaneous fires erupt as compressed methane, generated by the underground decomposition of waste, escapes into the sun. Toxic smoke mixes with the powdery ash and dust that rise from the sur-

Within the borders of this place that some called “hell on earth,” an informal settlement arose consisting of shacks made of scrap metal and other items scavenged from the refuse (Forbes 2012). Some homes of the onsite Churequeros as mentioned earlier did contain illegal forms of electricity and running water, but for the most part remained symbols of extreme poverty lacking basic infrastructure like plumbing. The working conditions of the trash pickers often spilled over to their living environments where families would sort through recyclables and old food that had been collected during the day for consumption (Telemundo, 2005). Unable to buy fresh produce, families living under these circumstances would often become ill from the scavenged (Telemundo, 2005). Due to the informal nature of their living environments many Churequeros if they were lucky were able to keep, livestock like pigs and chickens on their property for personal consumption. Just like the overall conditions of the dump however, humans and animals often lived side by side, contributing to the overall filthy environment and lack of sanitation (LTN, 2009).

Urban informality, in the way that it evolved and existed in La Chureca until about 2009 would soon change on a drastic level. Although many of the coming changes had great intentions and were somewhat successful, some of the advantages of informal living would soon become lost to the Churequeros and the means by which they used to rely on refuse for survival would be taken away.

THE BARRIO ACAHUALINCA COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
The municipal city dump of Nicaragua had been in operation since around the time of the 1972 earthquake. The location was used as a place for debris and waste following the quake. It was privately owned until 2011, “at which time the government seized the dump to prevent stalling on a planned development project” (Hartmann, 2012). This development project stems from a visit that the Vice President of Spain made to Nicaragua in 2007. The Spanish Vice President María Teresa Fernández de la Vega said after visiting the garbage dump that “no politician can set foot in La Chureca and forget it without doing anything” (Hartmann, 2013). As a result of this visit, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID) pledged in 2007 to donate 45 million
US dollars in aid to Nicaragua for the purpose of developing La Chureca and helping the residents of the dump.

The goals of the plan were threefold. AECID intended to invest 45 million dollars to "convert the open-air waste site into a 'modern sanitary landfill,' construct a state-of-the-art recycling facility employing on-site hundreds of Churequeros, and relocate people living in La Chureca to a planned housing development" (Hartmann 2013). The project began in late 2009 and was completed in 2013. The process of implementing the development plan involved the collaboration of various organizations including “the Managua local government (ALMA), various national ministries, international aid organizations and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Solidaridad Internacional), multilateral international agencies (e.g. UN-Habitat), engineering corporations (e.g. Tragsa), local NGOs (e.g. Dos Generaciones), the local community, and various intermediary organizations” (Zapata 2012). It is this four-year collaboration that brought about significant and tangible changes in Managua.

Researchers María José Zapata Campos and Patrik Zapata recently published a journal article about the AECID development project in La Chureca called Translating Development Aid Into City Management. The article addresses how the proposed project by the Spanish government was “translated” over to and implemented by Managuan city leaders. The Acahualinca Project, argue Campos and Zapata, actually shows a positive side to the implementation of development aid through collaboration. They explain how the process of implementing the goals of the development project evolved with regard to leadership. At first the project was heavily controlled by the Spanish and their specific agencies, but over time, the Nicaraguan government as well as some local NGOs was able to have some control over what happened with regard to the application of the plan. All parties agreed that it was better to have input from local authorities that knew the inner workings of the existing dump and the people who populated it. Campos and Zapata write in conclusion:

Despite the covert infiltration of powerful and distant control mechanisms…processes of allomorphism and hybridity contest the global forces and make it possible for local actors to shape projects initiated by international aid agencies. In this way, such projects come to better fit local needs and knowledge, as local institutions make them their own, run them with their own staff, exert local control over budgets and move the decision-making closer to those affected by the decisions. (Campos and Zapata, 2012)

Here Campos and Zapata give a positive glimmer of hope to the physical implementation of international aid plans and the ability of agencies to successfully collaborate with each other when so often this is not the case in development programs. The physical aspects of the project were indeed successful, with the building of the modern recycling plant completed in 2013 and the homes for the Churequeros finished shortly after.

It is clear that the collaboration of multinational agencies worked in this case of international altruism. If one were to visit La Chureca now, one would find a modern landfill where acres of burning, rancid trash once existed. Adjacent to the new landfill is the state-of-the-art recycling plant and now next to that are the new homes built for the former Churequero families that have family members working at the new plant.

The successful implementation of the Acahualinca Project is significant especially in La Chureca where many locals never believed that change would occur because people did not care. In one interview a Churequero skeptic of development aid stated, “I’ve always heard that help is coming, that it is coming from this country or that country, and so we just say, save yourself if you can” (Hartmann 2013). This sentiment was fairly common among those making a living from the refuse. The more pressing issue for trash pickers however was the amount of jobs that the new recycling plant would hold. EMTRIDES (the new government organization in charge of employment at the recycling plant) stated that it would hire only between 400 and 500 people to work at the waste facility (Campos and Zapata, 2012). This is an extremely low number compared to that of nearly 2000 that relied on the informal dump daily for survival. One Churequero stated in an interview that, “Everyone can survive (off La Chureca), If it is taken away, what will all the people do? If there aren’t jobs, then I don’t want them to take it away” (Hartmann 2013). This is a very important issue that would have very real consequences in the future for both the Churequeros that lived in the dump and those who commuted to access the trash daily before its demolition.

Although the physical implementation of the Acahualinca Project unfolded with a...
degree of success, the effects of the project on the Churequero community were far from perfect in the end. The project, which was completed in 2013, saw many people lose their means of survival in La Chureca and in some cases, even their homes. Although the long-term effects of the international investment have yet to be seen, if the immediate effects are indicative of what is to come, then the future looks a bit bleak. Although the intentions of the project were very much positive and optimistic, (one cannot discount the fact that the Ortega administration and AECID generally wanted to help improve conditions in La Chureca based on the goals of the project), the physical outcomes of development fell short in a few ways.

EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID ON THE LA CHURECA COMMUNITY

The issue of job loss is a major cause of dissatisfaction among those who used to work in the refuse. As stated above, hundreds of former trash pickers lost their jobs when La Chureca was razed to pave the way for the recycling plant, which only ended up employing about 400-500 people. In July of 2013, former trash pickers picketed EMTRIDES in protest of job loss and lack of monetary compensation (Moncada 2013). This protest however did not bring about any feasible change, only seemingly false promises by city workers that “their needs would be met ‘later’” (Hartmann 2013). Hartmann goes into detail about the problems that arose from the implementation of the Acahualinca Project. He cites a randomized survey that was done in three communities located adjacent to the previous dumpsite where “trash picking was the primary income for three-fourths of the interviewed houses.” He writes:

In approximately half the homes in which at least one person previously worked in La Chureca, not one person was hired by EMTRIDES. The situation is particularly serious in the communities of Alemania Democrática and COPRENIC, in which an average of 1.6 people per home lost their livelihood. Moreover, more than eight out of ten former waste trash pickers not hired by EMTRIDES are unemployed. Such an extreme increase in unemployment contributes to concerns about an increase in alcohol and drug use. (Hartmann 2013).

These statistics give rise to alarming conditions that have occurred as a result of development aid. What was intended to help improve the deplorable state of poverty of La Chureca has resulted in the further impoverishment of churequeros and a loss jobs for hundreds of people in the surrounding communities.

Loss of job opportunities is not the only issue that came as a result of the Acahualinca Project. The eradication of urban informality came at a cost even to those that benefitted from new employment at the plant. The lucky trash pickers that did obtain a job at the new waste facility now earn “$5,040 córdobas (US $206) per month roughly equal to the national minimum wage for industry-related work” (Hartmann, 2013). This amount according to Hartmann however, is reportedly “less than or equal to what they earned as pickers,” making it difficult for employees to continue making a living for their families. Furthermore, the new homes that were given to the churequeros are government owned and thus the new tenants will, after a grace period of six months, have to start paying their own utilities (ProNica, 2013). This is something that, under the blanket of informality, Churequeños did not have to worry about before. Moreover, this new community does not allow for the possession of and rearing of livestock, which was a major source of sustenance for Churequeños previously (LTN, 2013). These are both prices that the former churequeros will have to pay as a result of integration into more “civilized” society.

This formalization of slums can be compared to the case study that Professor Janice Perlman did in the favelas of Brazil. In her piece Marginality: from Myth to Reality she describes favelas as “an extremely functional solution to many of the problems faced by its residents” (Perlman, 2002). For Perlman, the fact that slums provide access to jobs and informal free housing for the poor has to be taken into consideration as something potentially positive. When government housing projects like the one that the churequeros have been assigned to require residents to start paying for services, this may end up causing more damage than good.

The effects of Spanish intervention in La Chureca are not all bad, however. Despite the fact that recycling workers are now earning somewhat lower wages and do not have access to their previous informal methods of survival, some seem to be happy with their new situation. According to reports from the AECID, one employee named Luis Rivas who was interviewed stated that he was now “proud” to be able to say that he has a home and can provide for his family and his children. He describes how previously he and all the other churequeros had
been dismissed by other Managuans as inferior due to their line of work, which was deemed uncivilized and disgusting. Now however, he takes pride in his work and in the progress that he is making at the plant, claiming that the plant managers are even teaching him how to drive the dump trucks and operate machinery, something he would have “never dreamed of” being able to do (AECID, 2013). Although this may only be the success story of a few, it does imply that the project has made some kind of a positive impact on people’s lives as it intended. However the question remains as to what extent this success will last and if it has the potential to help others in similar situations.

In line with the partial success of aiding some Churequeros, the Acahualinca Project has also seen a vast improvement in the environmental impact of the formal toxic dumpsite of La Chureca. However, these improvements seem to be largely centered within the actual recycling plant and new landfill. Recent reports in the local newspaper La Prensa indicate that the improvements have not had the far-reaching results that the government had hoped for. According to one article, the new waste management facility, which is said to be capable of processing 140 tons of waste per day, seems to not be running at full capacity and no one really knows why this is the case. This has resulted in the appearance of new, smaller but still informal dumpsites across Managua (Moncada, 2013). One of the largest of these illegal sites is ironically located near the new landfill of the former La Chureca dumpsite. In an article titled “La Chureca Has Not Disappeared” La Prensa writer Roy Moncada describes how “eight to ten trucks of household trash throw garbage at the bottom of the landfill where about 80 people extract paper, plastic and metals from the mound of refuse” (Moncada, 2013). Based on this information it may seem that the project, which supposedly installed one of the most efficient waste management facilities of Latin America, has failed to reach its goals. If this is the case, then the Nicaraguan government has a long way to go before long-term victories can be made with regard to waste management and informality.

REFERENCES


Over the past two decades the city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates has undergone extreme transformation. Today, radical change can be observed in Dubai’s infrastructure, economy, population, and social structure. To some, Dubai is “Manhattan on speed,” “a skyline on crack,” or a “capitalist’s dream on steroids.” Prior to Dubai’s wealth and urban growth, the global city existed as a modest tribal settlement. However, modesty as a description for Dubai is a farce. The Middle East’s most extravagant city possesses the world’s tallest building and hotel, luxurious shopping malls (one equipped with an indoor ski resort), man-made islands, and a skyline that is exponentially growing larger and larger. The city’s growth is apparent for the world to see, in fact it’s blatant. Many aspects of Dubai’s development are impressive, but certain aspects of its expansion are disturbing in nature. The most disturbing aspect of Dubai’s growth is the bonded labor force that has facilitated and constructed, and is continuing to facilitate and construct its rise and continues to aid such immense growth.
Bonded labor is defined as forced work for an employer for a fixed time without being paid, often as a way of paying a debt. Those employed to build the massive skyscrapers and infrastructures of Dubai are commonly migrant workers from South Asia. Dubai’s population now contains over three quarter of a million Bangladeshis and two million Indians. The mostly Indian and Bangladeshi laborers are assured honest work and good wages by recruiters in their home nations. Instead they find themselves in a foreign land with poor living conditions, revoked passports, irregular pay periods, and a debt to serve out their exploitative contracts. Dubai has attracted a substantial amount of negative criticism from the media for the exploitation of the workforce that has fueled Dubai’s physical and spatial growth. It has been reported that construction workers account for nearly one-fourth of the population; and their living conditions are described as horrific labor camps found on the edge of the desert. The work week for these workers is six days with 10-12 hour shifts (Ali, 2010). Only recently have human rights groups taken notice and projected the conditions to the rest of the world. Throughout history entire civilizations have been constructed by the hands and efforts of slaves and bonded labor. Today, in the “modern age,” our global civic society still allows this trend to continue, and it tends to produce the world’s most extravagant urban playground.

The research at hand aims to carry out a descriptive analysis of the dynamics, reasoning, and implications of the bonded labor situation in Dubai. In conjunction, this paper intends to analyze the political, planning and development endeavors Dubai has undergone in order to enter the global arena. The first portion of the discussion shall outline the historical context of Dubai along with a current look at the city’s real estate and infrastructure development projects. Ideally, this paper aims to shed light on the troubling issue of bonded labor in the dynamically changing Middle Eastern metropolis of Dubai.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Dubai as a global city is a fairly new concept, for the emirate only came onto the global scene in the late nineties and early 2000s. Saskia Sassen, a producer of a major globalization theory, focuses the importance of cities as the primary sites of global interactions. Sassen argues that global cities are essentially in a kind of dialogue with other global cities, that major flows of capital, people, and ideas circulate between them (Sassen, 2000). Dubai could be considered in amongst that global dialogue. The city may not be in the forefront of the conversation, but massive flows of capital, people, and ideas are without a doubt present and active in the Middle Eastern city. Roughly the size of Rhode Island, Dubai is the second largest city in the U.A.E. after Abu Dhabi. The governance structure is strongly influenced by both its British colonial heritage and an Egyptian law connection, which has made it particularly dependent on civil law principles, as well as the extensive Islamic Sharia law framework. Combining both influences, the U.A.E. regime is generally depicted as a constitutional monarchy federated with six other states (Acuto, 2014). Previous to the region’s ultra-capitalistic endeavors, the Persian Gulf city was a small pearl-fishing village when its current rulers, the Maktoum family, gained control over in 1883. However, the future and function of the small fishing village would greatly change in 1966 with the discovery of oil fields laying below the desert city’s surface. In 1969 the first barrel of oil was exported and the resource revenues were then allocated to fund future development projects. Development projects included massive infrastructure and private real-estate investments. The discovery of oil was a pivotal factor that induced economic growth and prosperity to the region, although the reserves were not as substantial as surrounding emirates. Dubai had only 4% of the U.A.E.’s oil, or roughly 4 billion barrels of reserves (Krane, 2010). Substantial amounts of oil lay in Dubai’s aforementioned neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi. From this realization, Dubai’s rulers and decision makers had to turn to other industries to help fund their elaborate economic ventures.

In the 1980’s, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, then the crown prince, positioned Dubai as a free trade oasis. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum is often considered as the “CEO Sheikh” fashioning his position more as a Chief Executive Officer rather than a king. The reality is, Dubai is a kingdom where essentially the law is what the sheikh decides it is (Ali, 2010). Resulting from Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum’s renewed economic policy, Dubai’s government agencies shifted economic focus from maritime trade networks towards large-scale, Western-style multinational development projects. The economic shift created an info-tech hub that attracted technology based companies who were actively involved in various sectors of the global economy such as media, finance, and tourism. The monumental economic shift attracted transnational corporations large and small from all over the globe. More and more global corporations now establish their regional/global business activity in Dubai to take
advantage of the tax free trade zones, along with the absence of bureaucratic entanglement policies, and relatively low operating costs (Ramos, 2010). Several sectors of the global economy have set up shop in Dubai and in-part have established hubs where innovation and economic activity can flourish. The zones/hubs include; Media City, Internet City, Knowledge Village, Healthcare City, Academic City, and Knowledge Village. However, in the context of modern economics and urban growth, large scale, Western style multinational development projects, like the ones previously mentioned, cannot prosper or survive without the presence of modernized infrastructure and services.

At the origin of development, Sheikh Rashid displayed no reluctance about erasing Dubai’s past. He struggled against great odds to modernize Dubai, and to improve his subjects’ lives. Unfortunately, modernization often comes at the expense of heritage, and this held to be true for Dubai’s iconic sites of tradition. It did not take long during the modernization process for the old cloth bazaar to be demolished. Sheikh Rashid was remorseless, stating, "What do you want that old place for? Let’s have a proper road in the town so people can get through" (Krane, 2009). Ultimately, massive capital infrastructure and private development investments were absolutely necessary in order to support Dubai’s new economic sectors and ventures. Thus, Dubai ignited rapid urban growth with the construction of several infrastructure investments. Infrastructure projects included a public transportation and road network system, a gargantuan airport that would go on to serve as an aero-hub of the Middle East, a thirty five berth port, as well as a bustling urban core that was gradually constructed to support the new financial/info-tech center of the region. It is imperative to keep in mind how exactly these infrastructure investments came into physical existence; through the practice of bonded labor.

DUBAI’S INFRASTRUCTURE & INVESTMENTS BACKGROUND
The construction and development of Dubai’s infrastructure acts as a representative mechanism that establishes a narrative of the metropolitan spatial development that has been directly influenced by international investment and trade flows (Ramos, 2010). Essentially from a clean slate, Dubai’s rapid urbanization is strongly influenced by global forces, particularly early foreign interest and investment from the United Kingdom. After establishing a dominant presence in other regions of the world, the British Empire turned its focus to the Persian and Arabian Gulfs. The focus towards the gulf was emphasized in order to create port and aviation hubs that would go on to serve and improve their expansive trade networks. British interest in regional affairs increased as the pearl trade sector grew, and once oil was discovered in Persia and Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the twentieth century, British firms (oil, trade & finance) engaged in the region more actively (Ramos, 2010). Following World War II, the British government and trade firms conducted themselves more paternalistically, and established a more direct protectorate relationship with the ruling sheikhs. The historic pseudo-diplomatic relationship kickstarted the development and coordination of massive infrastructure projects in Dubai. It is the British investment in massive infrastructure projects that has helped place Dubai on the global map and significantly separated themselves from other Arab cities. The sheikhs and government agencies of Dubai recognized that such infrastructure investments would provide further opportunity for the emirate to proposer and modernize. In the mid-twentieth century, Dubai saw the construction of an extensive road network, two massive ports, a large airport (with another larger airport in the works), a network of hotels, and the dredging of the city’s creek. Interestingly, the mega construction projects of the mid twentieth century were only the baby steps, for massive strides were soon to come.

THEN & NOW: A LOOK AT MODERN DUBAI’S URBAN FORM
In 2002, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum directed a major policy shift that would change the course of Dubai’s real estate climate forever. Until May 2002, according to the previous laws in Dubai, only Dubai citizens could own property on Emirati land. However, two years preceding the millennia, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum issued a decree which permitted foreigners to buy property freehold. The decree would greatly change the course of real estate development in Dubai for years to come. The construction process boomed and a huge number of infrastructures were constructed and sold rapidly to Emiratis and foreigners alike. Yasser Elsheshtawy, a scholar whose studies focus on the dynamics of urban development in Arab nations and cities, asserts the many complications of Dubai’s recent real estate developments. Elsheshtawy argues the developments are fragmented and exclusive, and have ultimately become the central focus of the city’s urban form. Increasingly the poor, working class and construction workforce, are driven out to the invisible labor camps and settlements, while the city itself is spatially organized to cater for the rich and powerful.
Elsheshtawy’s comments regarding Dubai’s spatial division of labor are aligned with John Friedmann’s global city model. In terms of job occupations, world cities are characterized by a dichotomized labor force; a high percentage of professionals specialized in control functions, and on the other spectrum, a vast collection of low-skilled workers engaged in manufacturing, personal services, and the hotel, tourist, and entertainment industries that cater to the privileged class for whose sake the world city primarily exists (Sassen-Koob, 1984). In the semi-periphery, with its rapidly multiplying rural population (and in Dubai’s case, a rapidly multiplying South Asian immigrant population), large numbers of unskilled workers migrate to world city locations in search of livelihood. Because the modern sector is incapable of absorbing more than a small fraction of this human mass, a large “informal” sector of microscopic survival activities has evolved (Friedmann, 1986).

Dubai is also a fitting case example of Friedmann’s spatial and class polarization theory. The spatial layout of Dubai closely follows the same principles of the world city formation model. Essentially, the model brings into focus the major contradictions of industrial capitalism, which consists of spatial and class polarization. Friedmann proposes spatial polarization occurs at different scales. The first scale is global and is expressed by the widening gap in wealth, income and power between peripheral economies as a whole and a handful of rich countries at the heart of the capitalist world. This holds to be particularly true amongst petro-states like the U.A.E. The accompanying scale of spatial polarization is metropolitan. Friedman describes the familiar story of spatially segregating poor inner-city ghettos, suburban squatter housing and ethnic working class enclaves. Spatial polarization emerges from class polarization, and in world cities, class polarization has three principal components: huge income gaps between transnational elites and low-skilled workers, large-scale immigration from rural areas or from abroad, and structural trends in the evolution of jobs (Friedmann, 1986). Additionally, spatial and class polarization is spreading to neighboring Arab cities with the increasing presence of Dubai’s real estate companies. Damac, the largest private developer in Dubai, now has a strong presence in Doha, Qatar. The private developer is currently constructing the Dubai Towers Doha, which will become Qatar’s tallest building (Elsheshtawy, 2008). Previous projects from the developer include; the Beverley Hills of Dubai, and a series of luxury villas located in Doha’s Lusail district. The urban experimentation that is occurring in Dubai is fundamentally influencing the rest of the Arab world. According to Elsheshtawy, the process of spreading Dubai’s urban characteristics to rest of the Arab world has been deemed “Dubaiization” (Elsheshtawy, 2008b). Similar urban growth and renewal models, not quite as extreme as Dubai, can be seen in Kuwait City, Manama, Muscat and Abu-Dhabi.

Elsheshtawy’s theory of fragmentation and exclusivity can be viewed in several of Dubai’s real estate developments and public infrastructure investments, specifically the transit network and the central business district (CBD) that acts as Dubai’s urban core. Urban policies and public projects that promote social equity for all residents of Dubai are completely absent, and as a result, the form and design of Dubai is structured for the global and city elite. The absence of socially equitable urban policies in modern Dubai is a playing factor that allows the city to operate in the global network. The non-existence of taxes allows the regime in Dubai to be unaccountable for the city’s inhabitants. The classic piece of rhetoric originating from the United States’ founding fathers, “no taxation without representation,” can be closely associated with the political regime in Dubai. The sheikh and government agencies do not require funding streams from public taxes. Nor does the general population elect any legislators or public servants to provide and protect the civil rights of the people. Therefore, the vacancy of taxation creates an eerie political dynamic; the regime does not owe anything to the people of the city, such as increasing their social equity.

An example of Dubai’s inequitable infrastructures is their public transit network. The system only serves the areas in which the rich and elite are located. Very little fixed route lines are directed towards the labor camps located on the outskirts of the central city (RTA, 2014). Social equity through mobility is an issue that few to none urban scholars have particularly addressed when researching the dynamics of modern Dubai. The official transportation agency, Dubai Transport, was established in 1998, but was later revamped as the Roads & Transportation Authority (RTA) in 2006. The agency oversees the maintenance and operation of Dubai’s road network, bus system, and the newly built metro rail & tram network. Dubai’s public transportation system is rather expansive with over 198 bus routes operating on weekdays, and speculated weekly ridership of thirty million riders.
During the early days of the immigration boom, a large spike in sales and rentals in the past five years (FlightGlobal, 2012). Much of the helicopter usage is to transport the global elites from Dubai International airport to the downtown urban core. Conclusively, both Elsheshtawy’s observations of Dubai’s relationship between the city’s spatial organization and social structure, along with Friedmann’s world city hypothesis, present a clear case that Dubai is a market society where the bulk of the population (construction and service workers) are merely “factors of production” (Ali, 2010).

FACTORS OF PRODUCTION: DUBAI’S LABOR FORCE

Ever since its independence, immigration legislation and controls have always been in place in Dubai. However, the business elite of the region have consistently opted for loose immigration regulation, mainly because they benefit from the cheap illegal labor. At the time of independence, half of the expatriate population working in the region existed there illegally. The influx of immigrants has always been a captivating cultural and economic dynamic in Dubai. Since the oil boom of the 1960’s, illegal immigrants have formed a large majority of the city’s population (Ali, 2010). Illegal immigration has been so massive that the U.A.E. government has had to issue several worker amnesty programs to mitigate the issue. In 2007, nearly 340,000 low-end laborers were provided legitimacy labor permits. During the early days of the immigration boom, a large proportion of individuals working in the local governments grew apprehensive of the implications and adverse effects of mass immigration. The local government workers felt the new immigrants would overwhelm local populations culturally and demographically, and would ultimately threaten the existing regimes (Ali, 2010). However, their apprehensiveness was unwarranted for the new immigrants (mostly Indian, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani) who were socially docile, clinging to the money they had and determined to make the most of it - they were not willing to rock the boat (Armitstead, 2008). Instead their apprehensiveness should have been directed towards the implications and adverse effects of globalization.

The docility amongst the immigration population occurs due to the visa and sponsorship process in Dubai. All immigrants working in Dubai are required to retain a sponsor, from which the sponsor then provides a labor permit. If a worker changes jobs, is terminated or quits, the worker is then required to leave the country for six months before they can return to seek a new sponsor and labor permit. The process is often referred to as the Kalafa system. Unfortunately for low level workers, this process means that changing one’s job is a very difficult affair. The complexities of the sponsorship process creates a strange product of social engineering - a guarantee of discipline and docility throughout the workforce. It is not all doom and gloom for all immigrant workers working in the Arab world. Recently, the regimes in Bahrain and Kuwait have binned the Kalafa system. Now immigrant workers in Bahrain and Kuwait will be directly sponsored and have their visas issued through the central government. The policy change will likely lead to better wages and increased labor mobility (Ali, 2010). In 2009, the police chief of Dubai called for a similar policy to be adopted in Dubai. However, his outcry was quickly silenced given that Sheik Mohammed possesses large stakes in most of Dubai’s construction endeavors (most of which are extremely reliant on the Kalafa system). The combination of the regime’s immigration approach and the mass social docility of the immigrant population has enabled the living and working conditions to fall below par.

In 2012, Ben Anderson, a BBC reporter travelled to Dubai to report on the labor force’s living and work conditions. Anderson has experienced turmoil in Afghanistan, the Congo, and Sudan, but what he found in Dubai was disturbing and surprising. In his report, he stated, “not an exaggeration, the hub of the Middle East is being constructed by the hands of slaves” (VICE, 2012). Through personal in-
terviews and undercover reporting, Anderson was able to expose the conditions of the labor camps and voice the stories of the poor individuals caught in the Kalafa system. The battle hardened BBC reporter described the process of how the Bangladeshi men he had met found themselves working in Dubai. In their local villages in Bangladesh, men are approached by recruiting agents who describe Dubai as a great opportunity to earn income for themselves and their families. They are promised $300 a month, which is a large sum in Bangladesh, for only a $2,000 “visa fee”. The fee, which is equivalent to 200,000 Taka (Bangladeshi currency), is payment for the agent to arrange the “privilege” to work and live in Dubai (VICE, 2012). The agents incentivize the opportunity with the prospect of sending the funds back to their families. The funds can then be allocated to purchase a farm or open a store. The $2,000 fee is to be paid off within the first six months to a year of employment. However, when the immigrant workers arrive in Dubai, their passports are revoked and they are already indebted to the Kalafa system. The opportunity to send prosperity back their families is lost while the recruiting agents make a handsome profit for trafficking workers to the Arab metropolis.

In reality, the immigrant workers only earn $120 a month for a six day, twelve hour work week. On top of the deception, Anderson described the living conditions of the informal settlements outside the city as squalor. When he first viewed the construction workers’ living arrangements, he stated, “You wouldn’t think it’s where the workers lived but rather where the machinery is stored. There were no lights, roads, or sewage systems” There were no flushing toilets, and the sewage overflow was so extreme that workers had to place cinder blocks as stepping stones to navigate and walk around the camp. The living quarters consisted of nine to ten men to one room with an open flame in the middle to cook their meals. No gas or water was supplied to the camp he visited. The workers’ food supply was limited to bread, rice and potatoes, with the occasional fish. While in the camp, Anderson had the chance to interview a man from India who had been stuck in Dubai for many years. The Indian man wept and was extremely distraught as he tried to recite his story. “There is nothing [here] for me, I have borrowed from people to buy food. It has been five months and I have not been paid at all. I have begged for food. Somehow I am surviving. My wife and family tell me to send some money or to come back….where will I go?” The banning of trade unions and collective bargaining in Dubai has essentially silenced the worker’s voices and their conditions often go unmitigated.

of workers challenged the sewage conditions, the construction companies responded maliciously, stating, “It is very difficult to change the habits that they unfortunately bring with them from their countries of origin” (VICE, 2012). Ultimately, the Kalafa system leaves the immigrant workers of Dubai helpless with no hope for the future. It is an unfortunate truth that the bulk of Dubai’s population is trafficked in from predominantly South East Asia to service the less than ten percent of the overall population, the citizens of Dubai and the upper classes.

Gusni Saat, an urban scholar who recently conducted extensive research on human trafficking patterns argues that the phenomenon will continue for one reason; human trafficking will continue to persist because the main players continue to accumulate considerable wealth through the exploitation of their victims. The main players in Dubai span across various individuals; recruiting agents, construction firms, private developers, even the government and regime of Dubai. Uniquely, unlike other cities, countless individuals and organizations benefit from the human trafficking industry, which is the biggest global illegal business after drug trafficking (Saat, 2009). The United Nation’s (U.N.) office on drugs and crime defines human trafficking as “the trafficking of persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UNODC, 2014). Under the U.N.’s definition of human trafficking, the components of “deception and forced labor or services” constitute the activity occurring in Dubai as actual human trafficking. It is without a doubt those trafficked to Dubai are in a position of vulnerability and are purposefully brought to the U.A.E. to be exploited. The city is entirely dependent on the industry and the rapid growth would have not occurred without the global phenomenon. Unfortunately, human trafficking will continue to persist so long as economic forces can exploit certain aspects of the urban structure, which is almost always biased in favor of economic forces, and economic forces are substantially ingrained in Dubai’s culture and governance structure. Immigration laws and local governments will be exploited and corrupted to cover and facilitate its
operations (Saat, 2009).

In conclusion, through human trafficking, the workers of Dubai lead highly exploited work lives, and are socially degraded (Ali, 2010). Their earnings are poor, and when they are paid, their rights under Dubai law are limited and seldom enforced. In spite of the conditions, people from all over the world migrate to Dubai seeking honest work and a new livelihood. Unfortunately, many of those who seek the supposed livelihood are unaware of what they are about to experience.

Throughout history, entire civilizations have been constructed by the hands and efforts of slaves and bonded labor. Today, in the “modern age” the newly created global civil society still allows this trend to continue, and produces the world’s most extravagant urban playground. Reiterating that the U.A.E. regime is generally depicted as a constitutional monarchy federated with six other states, and Dubai is a kingdom where essentially the law is what the sheikh decides (Ali, 2010) (Acuto, 2014). Principally, the regime in place does not allow a civil society to exist. Civil society being a process through which consent is generated, the arena where the individual negotiates, struggles against, or debates with the centers of political and economic authority (Kaldor, 2003). Instead the city operates within a market society where a massive bulk of its population are merely factors of production. Today, the city’s growth and direction encompasses myriad aspirations. The metropolis has a multitude of identities; the financial center of the Middle East, aviation hub of the Middle East, a place of innovation, tourism, design, grandeur, and culture. The city may possess unique identities and economic forces, but after concluding the given research, it became obvious that none of Dubai’s growth would be remotely possible without its darkest identity - a city built by slaves.

REFERENCES


